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ABSTRACT 
In Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994), Arizona public school districts and parents 
challenged Arizona’s school financing system arguing that it was not “general and 
uniform” as required by the Arizona Constitution. The purpose of this study was 
to analyze Arizona’s Students Fair and Immediate Resources for Students Today 
(Students FIRST) legislation, the remedy that resulted from the Roosevelt 
decision, empirically, and longitudinally. Three types of statistical analyses were 
conducted on a sample of 165 public school districts. Fiscal neutrality was 
measured for each of the eleven years of the study, to assess the association 
between the per-pupil Students FIRST funding level and the per-pupil property 
wealth. Multiple regression analysis was also conducted to assess if both property 
wealth and district size were associated with the distribution of Students FIRST 
funding. Finally, I analyzed the eleven-year average of the total Students FIRST 
funding distributed to school districts and assessed how the plaintiff districts 
ranked in the distribution. Overall, the findings revealed that Students FIRST met 
the fiscal neutrality standard in some, but not in all the categories and years of this 
study, per-pupil property wealth was only weakly related to, and district size was 
not associated with, Students FIRST funding. The analysis of average funding 
suggested that some property rich school districts benefited most from Students 
FIRST. These results suggest that the traditional measures used to assess the fiscal 
neutrality of operating funding may not be appropriate for assessing the fiscal 
neutrality of capital finance reforms. While the results of this study provide some 
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suggestive evidence that Students FIRST did not fulfill the Court’s mandate, 
additional research is needed as to whether or not Arizona’s capital finance 
system has resulted in disparities in funding that fall short of the constitutional 
standard. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
When Thomas Jefferson first proposed the idea of a free, state-sponsored 
school system, he could not have predicted the legal challenges that have emerged 
regarding funding for quality public school facilities. State legislatures have 
traditionally delegated the majority of the responsibility for funding public 
schools to local taxpayers via property taxes which, in many cases, has created 
disparities between property rich and property poor districts. This disparity 
became the focal point of Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994), a challenge to Arizona’s 
capital funding scheme for public school facilities. 
Arizona’s constitution provides for the creation and maintenance of a 
“general and uniform” public school system (Article XI, Section 1). In a series of 
lawsuits, school districts and parents have challenged the state’s school financing 
system in the state’s courts, arguing that it was not “general and uniform” as 
required by the Arizona Constitution (Roosevelt v. Bishop, 1994; First, 2007). In 
1994, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that, to comply with the general and 
uniform provision of the state’s constitution, the legislature must fund public 
schools in a manner that does not create disparities among schools, districts, or 
communities. Although this ruling applied to all areas of school finance, in 
Roosevelt the Court found that only the capital funding scheme for school 
facilities was inequitable and thus, unconstitutional. 
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Purpose of Current Study and Research Question 
The purpose of my study was to analyze Arizona’s Students Fair and 
Immediate Resources for Students Today (Students FIRST) legislation, the 
remedy that resulted from Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994), empirically, and 
longitudinally. I investigated whether or not Students FIRST created and 
maintained a general and uniform capital finance scheme. In addition, I assessed 
if the size and wealth of Arizona school districts were significant predictors of 
Students FIRST funding. The research question that guided this study was as 
follows: Did Students FIRST create a general and uniform capital finance scheme 
between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2009? 
My longitudinal analysis of Students FIRST had four components. First, I 
assessed the fiscal neutrality of Students FIRST by analyzing the capital funding 
provided to every district in the state under the legislation between 1999 and 
2009. Second, I assessed if there was a relationship between property wealth and 
district size and the distribution of Students FIRST funding that suggested that the 
funds were allocated in a manner that was not general and uniform. Third, I 
assessed the fiscal neutrality of Students FIRST by analyzing the eleven-year 
average of total funding distributed to school districts Finally, I used the eleven-
year average of the Total Students FIRST funding that was disbursed to school 
districts to analyze how different categories of districts ranked in the distribution. 
These analyses allowed me to provide a preliminary assessment of the changes in 
capital funding that resulted from Students FIRST. My dissertation is the first 
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empirical study of Students FIRST. As Arizona schools experience cuts in 
education funding, my analysis may prove useful in determining whether or not 
capital funding for public school facilities is general and uniform. My analysis 
also contributes to the growing body of research that assesses court-ordered 
legislative remedies related to capital finance reform. My research provides a 
rigorous and systematic analysis of Students FIRST for Arizona policymakers to 
consider as they make decisions about education funding during a period of 
economic decline. Finally, my findings also suggest there are limitations with the 
standard that is currently used in school finance to assess the fiscal neutrality of 
capital funding reforms. 
I introduce my topic and provide background information in Chapter One, 
in which I summarize the history of Arizona’s finance system, the court cases that 
forced a reform of the capital finance scheme, and the Students FIRST legislation 
that remains in effect today. I present a conceptual framework to conclude the 
first chapter and I define key terms used throughout my study. In the second 
chapter, I present a review of the literature focusing on: 1) school finance 
litigation based on issues of equity; 2) school facilities litigation based on issues 
of equity and adequacy; 3) the research assessing school finance reforms; and 4) 
an equity measurement model to assess funding for public school facilities. I 
discuss my research design in Chapter Three and in the final two chapters I 
present my results and the implications of my study. 
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A Brief History of Arizona’s School Finance System 
Arizona’s overall school finance system provides funding based on an 
equalization formula. A state’s funding formula is said to be equalized when 
funding by the state is provided in inverse relationship to a district’s property 
wealth (Odden & Picus, 2008). Arizona’s equalization formula has several 
components which work as follows. The state provides each school district with a 
base support level based on equal dollars per weighted students enrolled. Weights 
are used to account for district size, location, and grade span1. Other weights are 
added to the base support level to account for students with special needs and for 
districts that enroll students in kindergarten through third grade. These added 
weights provide additional money to districts. Enrollment is measured by the 
Average Daily Membership (ADM) which is the average number of students 
enrolled in a district during the first 100 days of the previous school year. A 
balance between local property tax rates and state and county equalization 
assistance generates the necessary revenue limit for each district (AASBO, 2010). 
The Arizona Legislature places limits on the amount of funding that can be 
generated without voter approval through the collection of property taxes from 
each school district. Because high wealth districts are able to raise substantial 
revenues via property taxes within their area, they receive less state and county 
assistance compared to low wealth, property poor districts that require greater 
                                                
1 Additional adjustments account for districts with fewer than 500 students, for districts 
who are designated as “isolated”, and for districts that serve preschool students with disabilities. 
Districts that serve students in grades 9-12 have additional weights to account for the higher costs 
associated with educating students in this grade span. 
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levels of state funding. Arizona’s equalization formula calculates a district’s 
Revenue Control Limit (RCL), Capital Outlay Revenue Limit (CORL), and Soft 
Capital Allocation (SCA).2 Districts can raise additional funds through voter-
approved overrides and bond issuance; districts are also eligible for additional 
federal money, such as Title I, based on the economic needs of its community.3 
Annually, each district determines where to allocate their RCL, CORL and 
SCA funds and must adhere to the limits that are set for each category. In other 
words, once a district adopts its annual budget, that district is prevented from 
using M&O funds for capital expenditures and capital funds for M&O 
expenditures. Likewise, funds generated through voter approved overrides and 
bonds are restricted to the purposes described in the ballot language and in the 
voter pamphlet. M&O overrides are for M&O expenses. Bonds and capital 
overrides are for capital expenses. Both M&O and capital overrides last for a 
maximum of 7 years and must be reapproved by voters for districts to continue 
receiving these revenues. The use of federal funds, such as Title I, are also 
restricted and must supplement the district’s annual budget. 
                                                
2 The RCL provides funds for the Maintenance and Operation (M&O) budget which is 
used for expenditures such as salaries, benefits, and expenditures excluding capital expenses. The 
CORL provides funds for the Unrestricted Capital budget to maintain facilities, and to purchase 
furniture and equipment. The SCA is used for short-term capital expenses to meet academic 
standards including textbooks, instructional aides and technology. 
 
3 Through special elections, voters can authorize additional property taxes to: increase, 
up to 15%, a district’s M&O budget for M&O expenses; authorize debt payment to issue and sell 
bonds for capital purposes; increase tax revenues for capital expenses. Title I money is based on 
the level of poverty within a school district. 
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Prior to 1998, local districts’ capital funding for school facilities was 
heavily dependent on the sale of general obligation bonds as capital funds were 
insufficient to maintain school facilities. This system created disparities as 
property poor districts could not generate sufficient funding to provide adequate 
facilities even though the residents of these districts often paid higher property 
taxes than their counterparts in districts with greater property wealth (AASBO, 
2010). In 1992, a group of poor districts and parents challenged this system of 
school financing in the state courts. In Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994) the Arizona 
Supreme Court ruled that the state’s system for capital funding of facilities and 
equipment was unconstitutional because it violated the provision in the state 
constitution that required the state to provide a “general and uniform” system of 
public education (Arizona Constitution, Article XI, Section 1). The Supreme 
Court ordered the legislature to create a new capital funding scheme to comply 
with the Constitution. In 1998, the legislature passed Students FIRST which 
created the current school facilities funding scheme that is used to allocate capital 
funds to school districts from the state. Students FIRST funding is not equalized;  
Arizona provides Students FIRST funds to all public school districts, regardless of 
wealth. 
Arizona Court Cases 
Article XI, Section 1 of Arizona’s constitution requires the legislature to 
provide the state’s citizens with a “general and uniform” educational system 
(Arizona Constitution). Subsequent sections provide the basic outlines of the 
 7 
school financing system and empower the legislature to delegate powers and 
responsibilities to local school districts. In Shofstall v. Hollins (1973), a legal 
challenge was launched by Arizona taxpayers and school children in a property 
poor school district. They claimed the entire school finance scheme resulted in 
lower quality education and higher tax burdens in property poor districts. 
Although the Arizona Supreme Court recognized education as a fundamental right 
protected by the state’s constitution, and reaffirmed the general and uniform 
clause, they ruled that the state’s school finance scheme was constitutional. The 
general and uniform provision under Article XI, Section 1 became the focus of 
Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994) 
In Roosevelt, property poor districts and parents challenged the state’s 
system of school financing a second time. In its deliberations the Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of the case to capital financing. Ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the Court described the state’s school finance system, taken as a whole, 
as complicated. The ability for districts to fund their schools depended on the 
amount of property tax revenue they could generate (Roosevelt v. Bishop, 1994). 
While the state claimed that the financing of public schools was the responsibility 
of school districts, the court argued that the legislature must establish and 
maintain a public school system (i.e., the structure of a K-12 and higher education 
system) and then fund that public school system in a manner that is general and 
uniform. The Court noted the disparities in capital funding between districts and 
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argued that the quality of schools’ facilities and equipment was directly 
proportional to the value of the property within each district. Property poor 
districts had higher tax rates but were unable to generate enough funds to meet 
their capital needs, whereas property rich districts had lower tax rates and an 
abundance of capital funds. According to the Court, this funding scheme 
produced a public school system that was not general and uniform because it 
directly caused substantial capital facility disparities across districts. While the 
Court did not directly address the issue of adequacy, it did note that there was a 
minimum threshold that all districts must meet: “Even if every student in every 
district were getting an adequate education, gross facility disparities caused by the 
state’s chosen financing scheme would violate the uniformity clause” (Roosevelt 
v. Bishop, 1994, p.7).  The Court ordered the legislature to reform the existing 
capital finance system in order to create a more equitable funding scheme for 
school facilities. In 1996, the Court ruled that the legislature’s initial attempt to 
amend the financing system was inadequate because the legislation did not 
substantively alter the overall funding scheme. As I explain below, the legislature 
made additional attempts to comply with the Roosevelt decision. The last of these, 
Students FIRST, created the capital financing system for public school facilities in 
place today. 
Hull v. Albrecht (1997) and Hull v. Albrecht (1998) 
In 1997, Governor Hull asked the Court to evaluate the Assistance to 
Build Classrooms (ABC) program, the legislature’s second attempt to comply 
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with the Roosevelt order. The Court ruled that the ABC program did not meet the 
requirements of Article XI because it “delegated to the districts the responsibility 
to provide adequate capital facilities,” continued to create “substantial disparities” 
among districts, and ABC did not create nor did it meet an adequate facilities 
standard (Hull v. Albrecht, 1997, p. 13.) In response, the legislature passed 
Students FIRST which the Court assessed in 1998. The Court determined that 
Students FIRST established a system to identify and fund adequate capital 
facilities (Hull v. Albrecht, 1998). However, because this funding scheme allowed 
districts to opt-out of state funding and did not allow participating districts to 
issue general obligation funds, the Court found that the system continued to create 
two classes of districts and, thus, failed the general and uniform test. The state 
amended the Students FIRST program to comply with the Court’s ruling in 1998 
by: 1) funding all school districts; and 2) allowing voters to continue authorizing 
overrides and bonds for their school facilities. Students FIRST continues to be 
Arizona’s system for providing capital financing to public school districts for 
school facilities. The Students FIRST program is funded by three main sources: 1) 
legislative appropriations to the SFB; 2) revenues generated by the Proposition 
301 sales tax; and 3) state land revenues. 
Students FIRST 
Students FIRST established the Schools Facilities Board (SFB) in 1999 
which is charged with distributing capital funds on behalf of the state, for 
facilities to public school districts and ensuring that districts maintain minimum 
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facility standards. The SFB adopted Building Adequacy Guidelines which 
established minimum standards for existing and new school facilities in Arizona 
and minimum classroom space for students enrolled. The SFB administers three 
capital funds for three programs on behalf of the state that are separate from, and 
in addition to, the CORL funding I described earlier: Building Renewal, 
Deficiencies Correction, and New School Facilities. The state legislature decided 
to fully fund Students FIRST without an equalization formula. All of the funds 
from Students FIRST are distributed as described below without any 
consideration of the property wealth of each school district. Likewise, all three 
funds are administered separately; that is, the SFB awards districts funds for each 
program without considering the funds that districts may or may not be awarded 
from any of the other Students FIRST programs. 
Building Renewal 
The Building Renewal fund was established to maintain the adequacy of 
school facilities once minimum standards are achieved. Prior to fiscal year 2008, 
the SFB provided funding to school districts for the maintenance of school 
facilities based on a building’s square footage, age, and student capacity. In fiscal 
year 2008 the state cut funding to the Building Renewal fund and since fiscal year 
2009 the state has not funded Building Renewal as originally designed. School 
districts must now apply for a Building Renewal Grant which is awarded based on 
priority need as determined by the SFB. 
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Deficiencies Correction 
The Deficiencies Correction fund was used to bring all existing school 
facilities to minimum standards by 2004. In 2004 the Deficiencies Correction 
fund was renamed the Emergency Deficiencies Program, an application-based 
program where districts must apply for funding from the SFB to correct facility 
deficiencies that threaten the immediate safety and operation of a school. If a 
school district has facilities that are below the Building Adequacy Guidelines, the 
SFB provides full funding to correct the deficiencies. 
New School Facilities 
The third program under Students FIRST is the New School Facilities 
fund which is used to construct school space in districts based on the Building 
Adequacy Guidelines. If a district must construct additional school space to meet 
facility standards and/or to address increased student enrollment, the SFB 
provides full funding; this includes the construction of new schools. In order for a 
district to be eligible to receive funds for new school facilities, they must meet a 
set of criteria based on that district’s enrollment projections and the additional 
square footage that will be needed to maintain the established facility standards. 
The SFB distributes new school facilities funds to school districts based on the 
following formula: (number of students) x (square footage) x (cost per square 
foot) = district allocation. In addition to the funds for building construction 
calculated by this formula, if a district must acquire land for new construction, the 
land costs are funded by the SFB. 
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To summarize Students FIRST, the state provides full funding to all 
school districts in the three categories described above. Unlike Arizona’s overall 
public school funding scheme where property wealth is taken into consideration 
in determining the level of state funding provided to districts, Students FIRST 
funding is not based on an equalization formula. As ordered by the Arizona 
Supreme Court, the State allows districts to raise additional dollars beyond 
Students FIRST funding to build, remodel, and/or renovate schools that exceed 
the minimum standards through voter-approved capital overrides and general 
obligation bonds (Albrecht, 1998). 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework that I used for my analysis drew from three 
equity concepts that are widely used by researchers to assess states’ school 
finance schemes: fiscal neutrality; horizontal equity; and vertical equity (Berne, & 
Stiefel, 1994; Rolle & Liu, 2007; Toutkoushian & Michael, 2007; Rolle, Houck, 
& McColl, 2008; Odden & Picus, 2008; Glenn, Picus, Odden, & Aportela, 2009; 
Odden, Picus, & Goetz, 2010). Because the Roosevelt (1994) decision centered on 
the general and uniform provision of Arizona’s constitution, I focused my 
conceptual framework on fiscal neutrality in order to assess the equity of facilities 
funding in Arizona. As I explain below, of the three concepts described above, 
fiscal neutrality is the concept that is most consistent with the way the Arizona 
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of “general and uniform.” Currently, there 
are no measures specifically designed to assess the adequacy of school facilities 
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(Glenn, et al, 2009). Although my study did not seek to analyze the adequacy of 
school facilities in Arizona, it was an important aspect of court decisions 
regarding school funding and is a facet of Students FIRST. Therefore, I also 
addressed issues of adequacy in the literature review provided below. 
Fiscal Neutrality 
“Traditional fiscal neutrality analysis assesses the relationship between 
current operating expenditures per pupil and property wealth per pupil” (Odden & 
Picus, 2008, p. 64). In a school finance system that is fiscally neutral, there should 
be no relationship between the funding level of each school district and the 
property wealth of each school district (Odden & Picus, 2008; Glenn, et al., 
2009). The concept of fiscal neutrality, originally referred to as Proposition I, was 
developed in the late 1960’s by Northwestern University Law Professor John 
Coons and his two students, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman, as a legal 
strategy for challenging public school finance inequities (Minorini & Sugarman, 
1999). Coons and his students were among a group of lawyers that were 
developing legal strategies aimed at addressing the funding inequalities associated 
with differences in property wealth. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman argued that 
districts in high property wealth communities could easily increase property tax 
revenues to support their local schools. Conversely, school districts that were 
located in property poor communities generated less money per-pupil through 
what were often higher property tax rates than more advantaged districts. 
Although many states offset this inequity via state aid formulas, Coons and his 
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team argued that property rich districts continued to have enormous wealth 
advantages, that poor districts had higher tax burdens than their wealthy 
counterparts, and that this was an unconstitutional form of wealth discrimination 
(Minorini & Sugarman, 1999). Coons, et al. argued that a state’s finance scheme 
could be fiscally neutral through the use of a state aid formula that made every 
district equally wealthy. Once this was accomplished, the state could permit 
districts to set tax rates as high or as low as they wished, and thus maintain the 
traditional importance of local control (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999). 
The fiscal neutrality theory played a role in two major school finance 
cases that I will refer to later in my literature review:  Serrano v. Priest (1971) 
and Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District (1973). Fiscal 
neutrality is an important concept in Arizona school finance. Equalizing state and 
county assistance, as previously described, is Arizona’s attempt to ensure fiscal 
neutrality of the overall school finance scheme. Overrides and bond elections 
allow for local control as voters determine if additional taxes can be assessed in 
order to raise supplemental funds for their local schools. The Roosevelt (1994) 
and Albrecht (1998) decisions required a capital funding scheme that would be 
equitable in order to meet the general and uniform provision of Arizona’s 
constitution while allowing for local control regarding overrides and bonds. 
However, the Arizona legislature fully funded Students FIRST without using an 
equalization formula and continued to allow voters the ability to authorize 
additional taxes for their schools. As a result, we do not know whether or not 
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Students FIRST creates a general and uniform school facilities finance system. In 
this analysis, I empirically assess Arizona’s Students FIRST legislation, using 
conventional measures of fiscal neutrality. 
Definition of Terms 
The equity finance concepts of horizontal and vertical equity, along with 
the principle of adequacy, are defined below as these terms are used to structure 
my review of the literature in Chapter Two. 
Equity: Defining equity is complex. Educators and parents want to ensure 
policymakers distribute educational resources, including facilities, in a manner 
that does not give preference to any one district, school, or type of student (Rolle 
& Liu, 2007). However, creating a fair and equitable capital finance system can 
be challenging as there are three types of equity concepts to consider: fiscal 
neutrality which I previously discussed; and horizontal and vertical equity which I 
define below. 
Horizontal Equity: Researchers have defined horizontal equity as the equal 
treatment of equals (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Glenn, et al., 2009). Funding schemes 
based on horizontal equity assume that all students, all schools, and all districts 
are similar and should have comparable levels of funding (Odden & Picus, 2008). 
The base support level in Arizona’s equalization formula reflects this type of 
equity because students are treated equally. There are seven commonly used 
statistics to measure for horizontal equity: Range, restricted range, federal range 
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ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, McLoone Index, and Verstegen 
Index (Odden & Picus, 2008). 
Vertical Equity: School finance literature refers to vertical equity as the 
unequal treatment of unequals (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Glenn, et al., 2009). 
Vertical equity recognizes the differences among students and the costs associated 
with those differences (Odden & Picus, 2008). In Arizona’s school funding 
scheme, the additional funding weights for special needs students and students at 
different grade levels are a form of vertical equity. No statistic exists that directly 
measures the vertical equity of a school finance system but there are two different 
approaches that can be used to assess vertical equity (Odden & Picus, 2008; 
Glenn, et al., 2009). Researchers can assign weights to students, adjust the 
funding according to those weights, and then use horizontal equity statistics to 
analyze the distribution of funds. Or researchers can remove all programs 
designed for vertical equity and assess the horizontal equity of the remaining 
programs (Odden & Picus, 2008). 
Adequacy: Some researchers have attempted to define an adequate 
education by discussing the resources needed for a specific standard of education 
and the cost of those resources (Verstegen, 2004; Verstegen, 2007). Others have 
defined adequacy in terms of dollars per student (Baker & Duncombe, 2004; First, 
2007; Thompson, et al., 2008). I draw upon Glenn, et al.’s (2009) definition of 
adequacy in school finance as, “providing sufficient funds to enable schools to 
educate their students to meet high standards” (p. 4). Although there is an 
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accepted statistic for measuring the adequacy of current operating funds, the 
Odden Picus Adequacy Index, there is no currently accepted measure to assess the 
adequacy of public school facilities (Glenn, et al., 2009). Equity and adequacy are 
conceptually distinct. Although funds to school districts can be distributed in an 
equitable manner, the amount of this funding may not necessarily be adequate. 
Summary of Chapter 1 
My study was an empirical and longitudinal analysis of Arizona’s 
Students FIRST legislation, assessing the equity of facilities funding in Arizona 
by measuring for fiscal neutrality. Currently there is no  accepted measure to 
assess the adequacy of public school facilities. I sought to answer the following 
research question: Did Students FIRST create a general and uniform capital 
finance scheme between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2009? In Chapter One, I 
provided an overview of Arizona’s overall school finance system, the court cases 
that lead to a reform of the school facilities finance scheme, a summary of 
Students FIRST, a conceptual framework that guided my study, and definition of 
terms that is used throughout my research. In Chapter Two, I provide an overview 
of current research on school finance litigation and on the issues addressed in 
Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994). 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Empirical studies evaluating the remedies of capital finance litigation are 
limited as is research that assesses the equity or adequacy of school facilities 
funding (Glenn, et al., 2009). The research describing court cases and decisions in 
individual state school funding systems is more robust. Because the physical 
environment is one component of providing students a quality education, more 
empirical research that evaluates the remedies of capital finance litigation is 
needed. My study adds to this body of research. In the section below, I review 
current literature regarding issues of equity and adequacy in school finance to 
demonstrate the need for and importance of analyzing Arizona’s Students FIRST 
legislation. I will focus on four central themes I identified in the literature: 1) 
school finance litigation based on issues of equity; 2) school facilities litigation 
based on issues of equity and adequacy; 3) assessing school finance reforms; and 
4) an equity measurement model to assess funding for public school facilities. 
School Finance Litigation Based on Issues of Equity 
Individual state constitutions provide for the creation and maintenance of 
public school systems. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
education is not a fundamental right under the federal constitution (San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 1973; Thompson, et. al., 2008). After Rodriguez, cases challenging 
state school financing systems were brought to state courts. Several state Supreme 
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Courts have ruled that education is a fundamental right (First, 2007; Thompson, et 
al., 2008). A few of these include: Alaska (Kasayulie v. State, 1999); Arizona 
(Shofstall v. Hollins, 1973; Roosevelt, 1994); Idaho (Thompson v. Engelking, 
1975); Kentucky (Rose v. Council for Better Education, 1989); New Jersey 
(Robinson v. Cahill, 1973); New York (Levittown v. Nyquist, 1978); Texas 
(Edgewood v. Kirby, 1988); and Wyoming (Washakie County School District v. 
Herschler, 1980) (National Access Network, 2010). Of the states where courts 
were asked to affirm education as a fundamental right under their state 
constitutions, only Colorado rejected such a claim (Lujan v. Colorado State Board 
of Education, 1982). Some scholars argue that from 1971 to 1989, most school 
finance litigation was focused on issues of educational equity; starting in 1989, 
plaintiffs increasingly challenged state systems of school financing on adequacy 
grounds (Glenn & Picus, 2007; Dee & Levine, 2004). 
California’s most prominent school finance case was the first of the 
modern-era court decisions based on equity. The Serrano v. Priest (1971) verdict 
gained national attention and became the model for other state school finance 
litigation (Dayton & Dupre, 2006; Thompson, et al., 2008). The plaintiffs in 
Serrano claimed that California’s finance system created funding disparities 
which affected the quality of schools. The California Supreme Court found the 
school funding system to be unconstitutional because the interdistrict inequalities 
in funding violated the state’s equal protection clause. The Serrano decision led to 
a plethora of lawsuits and subsequent school funding reforms across the nation 
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(Dayton & Dupre, 2006; Thompson, et al., 2008). In June, 2010 the National 
Access Network reported that all but five states faced school finance litigation 
regarding issues of equity and adequacy since the Serrano decision. The results of 
all other state cases have been mixed, some in favor of the plaintiffs, others in 
favor of the states. As of March of 2010, 27 state courts ruled that their school 
finance systems were unconstitutional, 17 states have had courts determine that 
their finance systems were constitutional and in one state, Iowa, the parties 
reached a settlement before the court decided the case (National Access Network, 
2010). 
One of the most well-known school finance cases is Abbot v. Burke. Over 
the course of 20 decisions between 1985 and September 2010, New Jersey’s 
Supreme Court has become extensively involved in shaping the state’s school 
financing system. In Abbott, the Supreme Court has attempted to ensure parity in 
regular education funding between the state’s poorest districts, known as Abbott 
districts, and the state’s wealthiest suburban school districts (Erlichson, 2001). 
Because the Abbott districts comprised only 30 of the state’s 551 school districts, 
Lauver, Ritter, and Goetz (2001) argued that the Abbott decisions focused on the 
state’s poorest districts and the decisions did not address resource inequities 
statewide. Consequently, both non-Abbott districts and middle-wealth 
communities suffered as a result of New Jersey’s school finance reform. Ritter 
and Lauver (2003) conducted a longitudinal analysis to assess this argument. 
Whereas the funding disparities narrowed between Abbott schools and wealthy 
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suburban schools, there were significant funding disparities between poor non-
Abbott and rural districts and Abbott and suburban districts. Furthermore, middle-
wealth districts were burdened by taxpayer disparities (Ritter & Lauver, 2003). 
Finally, Ritter and Lauver (2003) found that New Jersey’s attempt to increase 
funding in poorer school districts in order to bring them to the same levels of 
wealthier districts, only perpetuated disparities and funding deficiencies statewide 
and were “associated with below-average academic performance” (p. 598). This 
study suggests that the remedies resulting from the Abbott decisions may have 
helped to narrow funding inequities between a few districts, but perpetuated 
funding inequities across all school districts in New Jersey. I will expand on the 
Abbott decisions and its effect on school facilities later in my literature review. 
Along with New Jersey, other states have faced challenges to their school 
finance system based on issues of equity. The rulings have been mixed. In Texas, 
after the Rodriguez (1973) case was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Edgewood Independent School District was successful in its lawsuit claiming that 
the state’s system for funding schools violated the Texas State Constitution 
(Independent School District v. Kirby, 1989). In New York, although the New 
York Court of Appeals ruled that the state constitution guarantees students the 
right to the opportunity of a basic education and found that substantial inequities 
in funding existed, the state constitution does not require equal funding (Levittown 
v. Nyquist, 1978).  In 1982, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the state's 
education clause did not require absolute equality in providing funding for 
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educational services, concluding that education was not a fundamental right under 
the Colorado Constitution (Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 1982). 
Much of the early state-level litigation regarding school finance was 
concentrated on educational equity; more recent litigation has centered on issues 
of educational adequacy (Odden, et al., 2010; Education Next, 2009; Glenn & 
Picus, 2007; Dee & Levine, 2004). Researchers have found a key relationship 
between adequacy and equity in school finance; failing to fund schools in an 
equitable manner has often lead to inadequate schools (Odden, Archibald, & 
Femanich, 2003; Rolle, et al., 2008). Because the Roosevelt decision and Students 
FIRST legislation addresses equity and adequacy concerns and is based on 
funding for facilities, I review school facilities litigation based on issues of equity 
and adequacy next. 
School Facilities Litigation Based on Issues of Equity and Adequacy 
Not all states have a formal funding scheme to provide for public school 
facilities. As of 2004, eleven states had no formal capital funding programs to 
assist school districts in maintaining and/or constructing facilities (Duncombe & 
Wang, 2009). In the states that do provide some form of capital funds for schools, 
state-provided funding for school facilities has been found to be generally 
inadequate (Thompson, et al., 2008). Consequently, funding for facilities has been 
largely a local responsibility which, because of the disparities in property tax 
wealth across districts, has often resulted in funding disparities and property tax 
inequities (Crampton, Thompson, & Vesely, 2004; Duncombe & Wang, 2009). 
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As a result, property poor school districts, or parents living in property poor 
school districts, have often challenged their state’s school finance system 
(Plummer, 2006), as was the case in Roosevelt. In addition to Arizona, funding 
inequities and adequacy of school facilities have played roles in school finance 
cases in several states (Odden, et al., 2009). They include: Alaska (Kasayulie v. 
State, 1999); California (Williams v. State of California, 2000); Colorado 
(Giardino v. Colorado State Board of Education, 1998); Idaho (Idaho Schools for 
Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans (ISEEO), 1993); Kentucky (Rose v. 
Council for Better Education, 1989; New Jersey (Abbott Decisions); and 
Wyoming (Campbell County School District v. State, 1995 and State v. Campbell 
County School District, 2001). Yet few states have reasonably good data detailing 
the condition of school facilities (Picus, Marion, Calvo, & Glenn, 2005). The last 
national report assessing school facilities was conducted by the United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2000; this GAO report only pertained to 
school construction and not to the conditions of school facilities (USGAO, 2000). 
The federal government has not documented the conditions of school facilities 
nationwide since 1996. This makes it difficult to analyze remedies from court 
decisions regarding facility finance litigation, limiting the amount of empirical 
studies (Glenn, et al., 2009). 
Because New Jersey’s Abbott decision is arguably one of the more 
prominent school finance cases in the country, one would suppose empirical 
studies assessing the remedies related to school facilities would exist. There are a 
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few studies that describe the history and implications of this litigation (Erlichson, 
2001; Lauver, et al., 2001), and one that offers an empirical analysis of school 
funding inequities (Ritter & Lauver, 2003). But, as of October 2010, there are no 
empirical analyses assessing New Jersey’s Abbott reforms pertaining to school 
facilities. 
In 2000, a lawsuit, Williams v. State of California, was filed on behalf of 
California school children to address inequities in its public school system 
(Powers, 2004). The plaintiffs argued that a variety of resources and conditions 
were missing in many of California’s public schools, including unacceptable, 
deteriorating facilities (Glenn & Picus, 2007). The case was settled and approved 
by the court in 2004. Legislative proposals that were part of the terms of the 
settlement included facility maintenance and repair. Of the $1.2 billion in 
additional spending which resulted from legislation, $800 million was allocated to 
repair facilities at the academically lowest-performing schools (Glenn & Picus, 
2007). Yet, no empirical studies have been conducted to evaluate the remedies of 
this litigation in relationship to equity and adequacy. Glenn and Picus (2007) did 
argue that the Williams settlement, “will lead at best to the provision of minimally 
acceptable educational facilities” but did not provide any empirical findings to 
support such a claim (p. 390). 
Although empirical research in this area is very limited, a few studies can 
be found that are somewhat related. Picus, et al. (2005) conducted an empirical 
study assessing the quality of educational facilities in Wyoming. However, their 
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study focused on the relationship between facilities and student achievement and 
did not assess the remedies resulting from a court order. Dee & Levine (2004) 
presented empirical evidence that reforms due to litigation in Massachusetts 
increased state aid and spending to districts that received and spent the least prior 
to the reforms. But their study only briefly touched on capital expenditures and 
did not address the relationship between state aid and school facilities. Before I 
discuss how certain equity measurements can be used to specifically assess school 
facilities, I will summarize current research which uses equity measurements to 
examine school finance reforms more broadly. 
Assessing School Finance Reforms 
Many contemporary studies have examined the outcomes of state school 
funding reforms. These include: Rubenstein, Doering, & Gess (2000); Lauver, 
Ritter, & Goertz (2001); Ritter & Lauver (2003); Dee & Levine (2004); Verstegen 
(2004); Vesely & Crampton (2004); Picus, et al. (2005); Glenn & Picus (2007); 
Maiden & Stearns (2007); Rolle & Liu (2007); Toutkoushian & Michael (2007); 
Verstegen (2007); Rolle, Houck, & McColl (2008); Baker & Elmer (2009); 
Glenn, et al. (2009); and Odden, Picus, & Goertz (2010). Although there are a 
number of approaches used by contemporary researchers to estimate educational 
adequacy, the debates about what constitutes an adequate education and how to 
assess adequacy were not within the scope of my study. Therefore, I narrowed my 
focus to the research that examines the equity measurements used to assess 
reforms in public school finance as a result of litigation. 
 26 
There are three common elements used by contemporary researchers when 
performing equity analysis of school finance reforms: 1) conducting a 
longitudinal study; 2) measuring for horizontal equity; and 3) measuring for 
vertical equity. Longitudinal studies allow researchers to assess trends in school 
financing over time (Rolle & Liu, 2007), and generally compare indicators of 
school spending in a baseline year to spending subsequent to a school finance 
reform. Researchers that have conducted longitudinal studies and measured for 
both horizontal and vertical equity in order to analyze school finance reforms 
include: Rubenstein, et al. (2000); Rolle & Liu (2007); Rolle, et al. (2008); and 
Glenn, et al. (2009). Of these four studies, only Glenn, et al.’s (2009) study 
focused on equity analysis of finance reforms related to school facilities and is the 
only study that measured for fiscal neutrality. I will summarize the first three 
studies in this section and offer a more in-depth discussion of Glenn, et al.’s 
(2009) research later as their study pertained most closely to my analysis of 
Students FIRST. 
Rubenstein, et al. (2000) analyzed school finance equity in Georgia 
between 1988 and 1996 after a major reform in the state’s school funding system. 
This reform resulted from an unsuccessful challenge to Georgia’s school funding 
system where the state’s Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of large 
disparities in educational funding but found the funding scheme to be 
constitutional (McDaniel v. Thomas, 1981). The Quality Basic Education Act was 
Georgia’s effort to improve equity in funding schools, utilizing an equalization 
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formula to distribute funds to districts. Rubenstein, et al.’s (2000) results reveal 
that, between 1988 and 1996, the overall funding system was within acceptable 
levels of equity, with higher levels of vertical equity than to horizontal equity. In 
the early 1990’s when Georgia experienced a recession, overall equity worsened 
but then improved during the period of economic recovery. The researchers 
discovered that although the overall distribution of funds appeared to be more 
equitable in the latter part of their study, the relative share of revenues devoted to 
students in the low revenue districts appeared to decline. Finally, when examining 
the relationship between revenues and property wealth, Rubenstein, et al.’s (2000) 
study reveals Georgia’s use of an equalization formula to distribute funds to 
school districts “greatly reduce the inequalities that might otherwise arise from 
differential property wealth” (p. 206). 
Rolle and Liu (2007) examined levels of horizontal and vertical equity that 
resulted from Tennessee’s Basic Education Program (BEP) from 1994 to 2003. 
This school finance reform was the outcome of Tennessee’s Supreme Court ruling 
that the state’s school funding scheme was unconstitutional as it failed to provide 
sufficient funding to all public school students (Tennessee Small School Systems 
v. McWherter, 1988). Rolle and Liu’s (2007) research revealed that although local 
and state educational dollars per student increased between 1994 and 2003, 
Tennessee’s BEP did not improve educational finance equity. Using multiple 
statistical techniques to measure for horizontal and vertical equity, the researchers 
provide strong evidence that levels of inequity have either remained constant or 
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decreased marginally. Rolle and Liu (2007) concluded that the “influences of state 
dollars on levels of equity were outweighed by local spending efforts, particularly 
in teacher salaries and at the extreme ends of expenditure distributions” (p. 348). 
In 1997 North Carolina’s school finance system was challenged on the 
grounds that disparities in educational funding were unconstitutional (Leandro v. 
State of North Carolina, 1997). Although the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the state, leaving the state’s finance scheme known as the Public 
School Fund (PSF) unchanged, no empirical study had been conducted prior to 
2008 (Rolle, et al., 2008). The purpose of Rolle, et al.’s (2008) study was to offer 
an empirical examination of North Carolina’s PSF from 1996 to 2006, measuring 
for levels of horizontal and vertical equity. Using multiple statistical techniques, 
the researchers’ results reveal that during the ten-year period, levels of horizontal 
inequity remained constant or increased slightly, and the magnitude of those 
inequities remained large. Rolle, et al.’s vertical equity analyses reveal that North 
Carolina’s system for funding schools did not improve the vertical equity of the 
system and “the magnitude and influence of local district wealth per pupil is the 
primary predictor for expenditure levels across multiple spending categories” (p. 
94). The researchers provide strong evidence suggesting that although overall 
student spending increased between 1996 and 2006, the levels of inequity 
remained constant or decreased only negligibly. 
Finally, Glenn, et al.’s (2009) analysis of the Kentucky school finance 
reforms differed from the three studies described above in two ways. First, Glenn, 
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et al. (2009) measured for fiscal neutrality and second, their study assessed school 
finance reform pertaining to school facilities. Because my study analyzed the 
fiscal neutrality of Arizona’s school facilities financing reforms, Students FIRST, 
I will now discuss the empirical study conducted by Glenn, Picus, Odden, & 
Aportela (2009) more in-depth. 
An Equity Measurement Model to Assess Funding for School Facilities 
Glenn, et al., (2009) recently analyzed the equity of school facilities 
financing in the state of Kentucky, comparing changes to the state’s finance 
system from 1990 to 2004, using measures commonly used to assess the equity of 
school districts’ operating expenditures. As with the majority of school finance 
equity research, Glenn, et al. (2009) focused on the relationship between property 
wealth of each school district and their expenditures. According to the 
researchers, Kentucky is an interesting case to understand in more detail because 
it has an advanced facilities finance system with more than half of the funding 
provided by the state for school facilities. In response to the Kentucky Supreme 
Court ruling in Rose v. Council for Better Education (1989), in which the court 
found the entire school finance system to be unconstitutional, legislators enacted 
major reforms to Kentucky’s school funding scheme including the system for 
facilities funding. Support Education Excellence in Kentucky (SEEK) was 
implemented in 1990, which provided additional funds for school facilities 
through the Capital Outlay and Facilities Support programs. These two programs 
were intended to achieve horizontal equity. The Capital Outlay program is a flat 
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grant from the state which is designed to provide districts with $100 per-pupil 
annually. The Facilities Support Program of Kentucky (FSPK) is a mandatory tax 
of $.05 that is levied by all districts on each $100 equivalent value4 within each 
school district. “The state equalizes the tax collection up to 150% of the average 
assessed per pupil equivalent value in the state” (Glenn, et al., 2009, p. 6). The 
Capital Outlay and FSPK programs provide the base level of funding for district 
facilities and are the foundation of Kentucky’s facilities finance system. 
After 1990, the state enacted legislation to provide districts with additional 
facilities funding opportunities to achieve vertical equity. Between 1994 and 
2004, Kentucky created six additional facilities funding programs in three areas, 
enrollment, facilities deficiencies and one area with no apparent connection to 
vertical equity. The two programs to assist growth school districts experiencing 
increases in enrollment are the First Growth Nickel (FGN) program enacted in 
1994 and the Second Growth Nickel (SGN) enacted in 2004. Individually, each 
program allows growth districts to levy up to an additional five-cent equivalent 
tax. Districts choosing to levy for both the FGN and SGN receive equalization 
from the state for the First but not the Second Growth Nickel program (Glenn, et 
al., 2009). The two programs to correct for facility deficiencies were enacted in 
2003. Kentucky’s School Facilities Construction Commission (SFCC) Offer of 
Assistance provides districts with unmet facility needs extra debt service to 
correct deficient buildings. The Urgent Needs fund is outside the normal funding 
                                                
4 Taxpayers’ real property value plus additional elements of their personal property, such 
as car registration, comprise the equivalent value. 
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formula. Kentucky’s SFCC provides emergency funding to districts with 
buildings that are far below established facility standards (Glenn, et al., 2009). 
Finally, in 2003 the legislature passed two additional programs, the Recallable 
Nickel, an additional tax that can be levied by all school districts but is subject to 
voter recall, and the Equalized Facility Funding (EFF) program, “that provides 
equalization funding to districts that levied, or have debt service on, a ten-cent 
equivalent tax rate for building purposes for which they have not received 
equalization” (Glenn, et al., 2009, p. 6). Glenn, et al. (2009) conducted an analysis 
of horizontal equity, vertical equity and fiscal neutrality with Kentucky’s facilities 
finance scheme. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, horizontal equity is the equal treatment of 
equals. Glenn, et al. (2009) first evaluated the Capital Outlay and FSPK programs 
established by SEEK legislation which were designed to be horizontally 
equitable, and then the First Growth Nickel that was added in 1994. They 
calculated the federal range ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, 
McLoone Index, and Verstegen Index for all years between 1990 and 2005. Their 
results indicate that the horizontal equity of the Capital Outlay and FSPK 
programs increased from 1990 through 1997, and that the programs have 
remained “extremely equitable since 1997” (Glenn, et al., 2009, p. 6). However, 
there was some evidence that the First Growth Nickel program increased the 
horizontal inequity in the top half of the distribution (i.e., the wealthier districts) 
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when the First Growth Nickel was added in 1994 since this program provided 
growing districts with an additional source of revenue. 
The second horizontal equity analysis performed by Glenn, et al. (2009) 
included all eight programs. Glenn, et al.’s (2009) analysis helped to assess how 
the facilities funding programs enacted after 1990, which were oriented around 
vertical equity, affected the horizontal equity of the capital finance system. As 
previously defined, vertical equity is the unequal treatment of unequals, in this 
case districts experiencing rapid increases in enrollment, and districts below state 
school facility standards. Two programs, the Recallable Nickel and the Equalized 
Facility Funding programs, had no apparent connection to vertical equity but were 
still added to Kentucky’s capital funding scheme and analyzed by the researchers 
(Glenn, et al., 2009). Their results indicate that the addition of these six programs 
caused Kentucky’s overall facilities finance system to be less equitable than the 
two original foundation programs (Capital Outlay and FSPK). As with their first 
horizontal equity analysis, the majority of the inequities in Kentucky’s system 
occurred in the top half of the distribution, suggesting that property wealthy 
districts received more facility funds. (Glenn, et al., 2009). 
As I previously stated, no statistic exists to directly measure the vertical 
equity of any finance system; yet there are two approaches researchers can use to 
assess the vertical equity of a system (Odden & Picus, 2008; Glenn, et al., 2009). 
In the first approach researchers assign weights to students in need of extra 
services, adjust the funding according to those assigned weights and then assess 
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the funding using five different measures of horizontal equity (federal range ratio, 
coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient, McLoone Index, and Verstegen Index). 
In the second approach, researchers remove all programs intended to achieve 
vertical equity from the variables used to calculate horizontal equity; once 
removed, the five measures of horizontal equity are calculated (Odden & Picus, 
2008). 
To assess the vertical equity of Kentucky’s capital funding system, Glenn, 
et al. (2009) used the second approach with modifications. The second horizontal 
equity analysis conducted by Glenn, et al., (2009), as previously described, 
provided the first step of measuring for equity of all eight programs. The 
researchers went further and investigated the extent to which the funding from the 
eight programs reached the intended districts. Glenn, et al., (2009) combined eight 
of the programs into four groups. The foundation programs (Capital Outlay and 
FSPK programs) were analyzed as one group, the two growth funds intended for 
growth districts (First and Second Nickel programs) as the second group, and 
analyzing the two facility deficiencies funds for districts with below standard 
facilities (SFCC Offer of Assistance fund and Urgent Needs funds) as a third 
group. The two programs determined by the researchers to have no apparent 
connection to vertical equity, the Recallable Nickel and the Equalized Facility 
Funding programs, were also grouped together and analyzed. Glenn et al.’s (2009) 
analyses reveal that Kentucky’s system is far from achieving vertical equity. Their 
results are as follows. 
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The Capital Outlay and FSPK program funds, designed to achieve 
horizontal equity, were equitably distributed. The programs designed to achieve 
vertical equity for growing districts, the First and Second Nickel programs, 
reached their intended targets. Although districts with the most facility needs 
received the most facility funds from the SFCC Offer of Assistance fund and the 
Urgent Needs fund, the programs designed to reach vertical equity for districts 
with building needs, when the researchers totaled all eight capital funds, the 
distribution of funds was not vertically equitable. Districts with the least facility 
needs received the most overall facility funding and districts with the most facility 
needs received the least amount of funding. Small districts, both poor and not 
poor, possessed the most unmet needs and received the least amount of funding 
while growing districts had greater access to funding and, thus, higher quality 
school facilities. Poor but not small districts were in the middle. 
To assess fiscal neutrality, the researchers assessed the correlations 
between districts’ property wealth, and their revenues and expenditures and the 
elasticity5 of these variables for each year in the analysis. Their findings show that 
Kentucky’s system for facilities funding was fiscally neutral from 1990-2003. 
After adding five additional programs in 2003, the measure of elasticity of 
Kentucky’s system indicated that wealthier districts had access to greater funding 
                                                
5 “The elasticity measures the rate at which school spending increases as property wealth 
increases” (Glenn, et al., 2009, p. 8). 
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than poorer districts enabling growing districts6 to have higher quality facilities. 
Thus, Kentucky’s facilities finance system was no longer fiscally neutral (Glenn, 
et al., 2009). 
In summary, the results of Glenn, et al. (2009) revealed that Kentucky’s 
facilities finance system was fiscally neutral between 1990 and 2003. After 2003, 
when Kentucky added additional capital programs to meet the needs of certain 
districts (growth districts and those with below standard facilities) the school 
facilities finance system became less equitable and less fiscally neutral. In 
addition, school districts that were growing, which tended to be wealthier 
districts, had access to greater funding and better school facilities than all small 
and all poor school districts. Glenn, et al.’s (2009) findings suggest that the 
changes to Kentucky’s facility finance system in 2003 lead to greater inequities 
and fell short of fiscal neutrality. While capital funding programs were added to 
the Kentucky’s facility funding scheme to allow districts to raise additional 
revenues for capital purposes, the distribution of capital funds tended to go to 
districts least in need. 
Glenn, et al. (2009) used conventional measures to assess for the fiscal 
neutrality of operations funding. As they acknowledged, there are no generally 
accepted equity standards for facilities. As a result, they used the standard for 
operating expenses for comparative purposes only. As I will suggest in Chapter 5, 
the findings I present in this study coupled with Glenn, et al.’s (2009) findings 
                                                
6 Glenn, et al., (2009) find that growing districts tend to be property rich. 
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described above raise questions about whether or not the measures for fiscal 
neutrality used for operations funding are appropriate for assessing facilities 
funding. 
Summary of Chapter 2 
I reviewed current literature regarding issues of equity and adequacy in 
school finance to demonstrate the need and importance of analyzing Arizona’s 
Students FIRST legislation. I focused my literature review on four central themes: 
1) school finance litigation based on issues of equity; 2) school facilities litigation 
based on issues of equity and adequacy; 3) assessing school finance reforms; and 
4) an equity measurement model to assess public school facilities. With the 
exception of the research conducted by Glenn, et al. (2009), there is a void in the 
research analyzing the remedies of court-ordered school finance reforms 
pertaining to school facilities. 
I present the methodology for my study in Chapter Three that, in part, 
modified the methods used in the Kentucky study I described above in order to 
address my research question: Did Students FIRST create a general and uniform 
capital finance scheme between 1999 and 2009? 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994), the Arizona Supreme Court argued that 
education and schools will never be exactly equal and complete horizontal 
equality is not the intent of a general and uniform finance scheme. Yet the court 
argued that large inequities in funding fall short of the constitutional standard: 
“Funding mechanisms that provide sufficient funds to educate children on 
substantially equal terms tend to satisfy the general and uniform requirement. 
School financing systems which themselves create gross disparities are not 
general and uniform” (p. 7). My analysis assessed if the State of Arizona was 
successful in producing a general and uniform capital finance system via Students 
FIRST legislation. I predicted that a) the capital funding scheme created by the 
legislature in Students FIRST initially complied with the Court’s interpretation of 
the uniformity clause in Roosevelt (1994), but b) that Students FIRST did not 
sustain a general and uniform system over time. While the results of my study 
provide some suggestive evidence that Students FIRST did not fulfill the Court’s 
mandate in general, the results for the second prediction are mixed. Additional 
research is needed to assess whether or not Students FIRST has resulted in 
disparities in funding that fall short of the constitutional standard. 
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The variables I used in my study were: a) Students FIRST funding (SFF); 
b) property wealth; and c) the Average Daily Membership (ADM)7 of school 
districts in Arizona. I conducted two types of statistical analyses to examine 
Students FIRST between 1999 and 2009. Because fiscal neutrality is the school 
finance concept that is most consistent with the way the Arizona Supreme Court 
interpreted the meaning of general and uniform, I first measured for fiscal 
neutrality using the conventional methods applied in contemporary school finance 
research (Odden & Picus, 2008; Glenn, et al., 2009). A fiscally neutral school 
finance system is one where there is a weak association between the funding level 
and the property wealth of each school district. I then conducted a multiple 
regression analysis to determine the association between the amount of total 
Students FIRST funding districts received and two predictor variables: 1) property 
wealth; and 2) school district size.8 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, conducting a longitudinal study to assess 
trends in funding levels over time is one of three common elements used by 
contemporary researchers when performing equity analyses of school finance 
reforms, (Rolle & Liu, 2007). I did the same. Conducting a longitudinal study of 
Students FIRST legislation allowed me to assess trends in facilities funding 
between 1999 and 2009. By measuring for fiscal neutrality across this eleven-year 
                                                
7 The Arizona Department of Education and the Arizona Auditor General use the 100th 
Day Average Daily Membership to determine the size of a school district; the higher the ADM of 
a district, the larger the school district is in comparison to a district with a lower ADM. 
 
8 Appendix B details the size categories of Arizona school districts as reported by 
Arizona’s Auditor General. 
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period, my goal was to assess if this system initially created an equitable 
distribution of capital funds and if so, whether or not capital funding remained 
equitable over time. 
Variables and Data Sources 
The unit of analysis was the school district. Each of my variables was 
measured on a per-pupil basis. My variables included funds districts received 
from the Building Renewal, Deficiency Correction, and New School Facilities 
programs; an additional variable totaled the funding each district received from all 
three programs. The other district-level variables utilized in my analysis were 
property wealth and ADM for each year between 1999 and 2009. Property wealth 
was measured using the secondary assessed valuation (SAV) of all state property 
residing within each school district because all voter-approved capital overrides 
and bonds are funded through the secondary tax rate. I used ADM to calculate 
per-pupil measures of all of the variables described above; ADM was also used as 
a measure of district size in my multiple regression analyses. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the variables I used in my study as described above. 
The sources for my data are considered by the Arizona State Legislature, 
and various school and finance organizations (Arizona Association of School 
Business Officials, Arizona Department of Education, Stone & Youngberg, LLC) 
to be reliable and consistent sources of information on school district financing. 
SAV figures were drawn from the annual Property Tax Rates and Assessed 
  
 40 
Table 1  
Summary of Variables  
Variable of  Interest Definition Calculation 
Property Wealth:  
 !!" 
 
 
Property Wealth was based 
on the Secondary Assessed 
Value (SAV) of all non-
federal commercial and 
personal property within 
each school district. 
 
District Property Wealth 
was calculated per pupil:  
 !!" = ! !"#!"# 
 
Students FIRST Funding- 
Building Renewal: 
 
  !!" 
 
 
Building Renewal funds 
were disbursed to school 
districts for the 
maintenance of school 
facilities.  
Building Renewal was 
calculated per pupil:  
 !!" = ! !"#!"# 
 
Students FIRST Funding- 
Deficiencies Correction: 
 !!"  
 
 
Deficiencies Correction 
funds were disbursed to 
school districts to bring 
school facilities to 
minimum standards. 
Deficiencies Correction 
was calculated per pupil:  
 !!" = ! !"#!"# 
 
Students FIRST Funding- 
New School Facilities:  
 !!"# 
 
 
New School Facilities 
funds were disbursed to 
school districts to construct 
school space in order to 
meet facility standards 
and/or construct new 
schools due to growth.  
 
New School Facilities was 
calculated per pupil:  
 !!"# = ! !"#!"# 
 
Total Students FIRST 
Funding:   
 !!"# 
Total Students FIRST 
funding was based on all 
funds disbursed to school 
districts from the Building 
Renewal, Deficiencies 
Correction, and New 
School Facilities funds.  
Total Students FIRST 
funding was calculated per 
pupil:  
 !!"# = ! !"#!"# 
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Values reports provided by the Arizona Tax Research Association (ATRA). The 
annual reports from the School Facilities Board (SFB) which lists all the Arizona 
school districts that received funding from each of the three programs were used 
to create the Students FIRST funding variables. ADM for each school district can 
be obtained from multiple sources, i.e., the SFB, each district’s Annual Financial 
Report, the Arizona Department of Education, each district’s expenditure budget, 
the Arizona Auditor General, however the figures for ADM  are not consistent 
across these sources. I used the figures for ADM provided by the SFB as those 
were the figures it used to calculate and distribute Students FIRST disbursements 
to school districts during the ten-year period of my study. 
Population and Sample 
The sample for my study was comprised of 165 public school districts in 
Arizona out of the population of 245 Arizona districts listed by ATRA during the 
eleven-year period of my study.9 Initially, I reviewed descriptive statistics on a 
sample of 198 school districts, only omitting 47 districts. However, in my 
preliminary analyses I determined that this initial sample contained two sets of 
outliers which could have biased my results when I conducted my fiscal neutrality 
and multiple regression analyses. Thus, I narrowed my sample to 165 Arizona 
public school districts.  Although omitting 80 school districts may seem high, 
between 1999 and 2009, the 165 districts included in my sample served an 
                                                
9 The number of Arizona school districts varied from year to year due to consolidation 
and the addition of accommodation and special school districts during the ten-year period of my 
study. 
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average of 94% of Arizona’s public school students attending conventional public 
schools.10 Therefore, my sample districts served a majority of the public school 
students in the state. Appendix A lists the omitted districts and the reasons for 
their exclusion. With the exception of San Carlos Unified School District, all of 
the districts that were named parties in the Roosevelt (1994) and Albrecht (1997, 
1998) cases were included in the sample. 
I omitted 80 school districts for one or more of the following reasons: 1) 
missing ADM and/or SAV information; 2) overlapping tax jurisdictions; 3) 
consolidation of school districts; and 4) outlier conditions due to district size and 
Federal Impact Aid. Because the variables for property wealth and per-pupil 
Students FIRST funding for each school district are calculated on a per-pupil 
basis, the 16 districts that have missing information on any of the ADM or SAV 
variables were excluded. In addition, Arizona classifies some public school 
districts as accommodation school districts and special school districts which 
reside within regular school districts. SAV is not calculated for accommodation or 
special school districts, which excluded an additional 18 from my study. Other 
school districts overlap into more than one Arizona county which made it difficult 
to determine SAV. These districts have two different sets of property valuations 
from two different counties, which were calculated by two different county 
assessors. Thus, the 3 districts that reside in overlapping tax jurisdictions were 
                                                
10 Charter schools are not included in my study as they do not receive capital funding for 
facilities via Students FIRST but are allocated additional assistance funding that can be used for 
capital purposes. Thus, they are not relevant to the analyses. According to NCES (2011) charter 
schools served approximately 10 percent of the school age students in 2008-2009. 
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also excluded from my study. In addition, the 10 school districts that were 
consolidated into larger districts were excluded due to incomplete ADM and SAV 
information. Finally, two types of outlier districts became evident when I initially 
reviewed the descriptive statistics for the 198 sample: a) Very small school 
districts; and b) high Federal Impact Aid11 districts. A total of 33 districts were in 
these two categories. 
Very Small School Districts 
Fifteen school districts that had an average ADM of 50 or below during 
the eleven-year period of my study and were categorized as Very Small School 
Districts by the Arizona Auditor General (Appendix B). Of those, 9 school 
districts were in the top 12% of districts ranked by property wealth and 12 were in 
the top quartile. Including these school districts in the sample, which were outliers 
on two key variables, size and property wealth, could skew the results of my 
analyses. Thus, 15 school districts were omitted due to being classified as very 
small. 
                                                
11 Some school districts reside in large areas of land owned by the federal government 
which decreases property valuations. To compensate for this loss in property value, the Federal 
Government provides additional funds for school districts for use in their M & O and/or Capital 
funds. All Federal Impact Aid (FIA) districts were initially analyzed separately to compare the 
differences in property wealth between FIA and non-FIA districts. However, after reviewing initial 
descriptive statistics all but 18 FIA districts were included in my study because the majority had 
property wealth that was comparable to non-FIA districts. 
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High Impact Aid Districts 
In the fall of 2010, the Arizona Department of Education reported that 53 
school districts received Federal Impact Aid (FIA) between 2007 and 200912. Of 
these, 3 were classified as Accommodation or Special school districts, which had 
already been omitted from my study. I initially created a single indicator variable 
denoting the remaining 50 districts who received FIA in order to separate them 
from non-FIA districts. I had intended to study these districts separately. 
However, after an initial review of the descriptive statistics, it became apparent 
that not all FIA districts were the same. As a result, I separated the FIA districts 
by the amount of funds received in relation to state aid. Of the 50 remaining FIA 
districts, I classified 18 as being High Impact Aid districts based on two criteria: 
1) a primary assessed tax rate of zero; and 2) the amount of FIA districts received 
was greater than 60% of the amount of state aide given by the Arizona 
legislature.13 Appendix C provides additional information for the 53 districts that 
received FIA. 
My sample of 165 Arizona public school districts was a representative 
sample of all Arizona school district for the following reasons: 1) it accounted for 
                                                
12 The Arizona Department of Education did not have any records regarding the amount 
of Federal Impact Aid distributed to school districts prior to 2007. 
 
13 Having a Primary Assessed Value (PAV) tax rate of zero is an indication that there is 
not enough of a property tax base for the state to levy a PAV tax rate due to school districts 
residing in large areas of federal land. If a school district is levied a PAV tax rate but receives 60% 
or more of FIA in relation to their state aid, they were classified as a High Impact Aid district. 
Districts that received 60% or more of FIA were provided additional federal aid that is comparable 
or more than the state aid provided to all other school districts and, thus, were not as property poor 
as one might suppose. 
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districts that served an average of 94% of Arizona public school students 
attending conventional public schools; 2) it included districts with complete 
information in order to properly calculate the variables used in my study; and 3) it 
accounted for outliers that could have biased the results of my analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Throughout the eleven-year period of my study, the amount of funding 
distributed within and across the categories was inconsistent and varied widely.14 
With the exception of the Building Renewal funds, relatively small amounts of 
Students FIRST funds were distributed to districts in 1999 as the new funding 
scheme had just been enacted. Funding for Building Renewal was uneven. 
Building Renewal funds were not distributed in 2004 and there was a substantial 
decline in the amount of funding dispersed to school districts due to cuts by the 
state in 2008 and 2009. The greatest amounts of Deficiencies Correction funding 
were distributed between 2002 and 2005 as school facilities were being brought 
up to the new facilities standards established by the SFB. There was greater 
variation in Deficiencies Correction funding across districts between 2000 and 
2006 as some school districts needed more funding to bring their facilities up to 
standards while other districts met and may have exceeded facility standards. 
 
                                                
14 The large standard deviations for all of the variables and across all years suggest that 
the distribution of the variables was skewed, which I confirmed by inspecting the histograms for 
selected years. Most of the districts in the sample received small amounts of funding from 
Students FIRST. 
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After 1999, funding for New School Facilities ranged from a low of $214 
per-pupil in 2001 to a high of $825 per-pupil in 2002. Although New School 
Facilities funding was more consistent than the other two programs throughout 
the eleven-year period, the variation in funding across districts was consistently 
higher. The large variation in funding for Deficiencies Correction and New 
School Facilities, programs designed to bring facilities to minimum standards, 
suggests that there was support for the plaintiff’s position in the Roosevelt (1994) 
case that there were gross disparities in the condition of school facilities prior to 
the Court’s decision. What remained to be analyzed was whether or not the 
distribution of Students FIRST funding after the Roosevelt (1994) decision was 
general and uniform. 
Per-pupil property wealth grew consistently between 2002 and 2009, with 
a slight decrease between 2004 and 2005. The variation in property wealth across 
the districts in the sample was large and narrowed only slightly between various 
years. The wide range in property value suggested that it was important to assess 
if property wealth was associated with Students FIRST funding. The mean ADM 
grew slightly each year with a very small decrease in 2009. However, because 
there was a wide range in ADM between districts throughout the eleven-year 
period, I further analyzed the data to examine if, along with property wealth, there 
was a relationship between Students FIRST funding and the size of a school 
district. 
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Fiscal Neutrality Analysis 
To measure for fiscal neutrality I applied two common measures utilized 
in contemporary school finance research (Odden & Picus, 2008; Glenn, et al., 
2009): a) the correlation coefficient for each of the four Students FIRST funding 
variables and property wealth; and b) the elasticity. According to Odden and 
Picus (2008), “Both fiscal neutrality statistics indicate whether the educational 
object is a function of some variable to which it should not be related, such as the 
local tax base” (p.65). It was important that I assessed the fiscal neutrality for the 
total amount of Students FIRST funding distributed and then for each of the three 
Students FIRST programs in order to assess if a) there was a relationship between 
funding and property wealth, and b) if so, if it differed by type of funding. 
The correlation coefficient was calculated using the following formula: 
!!" = ! !!"!!− ! X!" !![! !!"! − ( !!")!][! !! − ( !)!] 
where 
n is the size of the sample 
RXY  is the correlation coefficient between per pupil property wealth and 
per pupil Students FIRST funding 
XPW is per-pupil property wealth 
Y is per pupil Students FIRST funding broken down accordingly: 
YBR is per-pupil Building Renewal funds disbursed 
YDC is per-pupil Deficiencies Correction funds disbursed 
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YNSF is per-pupil New School Facilities funds disbursed 
YTSF is per-pupil Total Students FIRST funds disbursed 
For my analysis of fiscal neutrality, the correlation coefficient indicated 
the strength of the relationship between per-pupil funding from Students FIRST 
and per-pupil property wealth. Elasticity indicated the magnitude of that 
relationship. “Technically, the elasticity indicates the percent change in one 
variable, say, expenditures per pupil, relative to a 1 percent change in another 
variable, say, property wealth per pupil” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p.65). Odden and 
Picus (2008) strongly recommend assessing the correlation coefficient and 
elasticity jointly in order to properly measure for fiscal neutrality. The correlation 
coefficient ranges in value between -1.0 and 1.0. A negative correlation indicates 
that as per-pupil property wealth increased, per-pupil funding decreased; a 
positive correlation signifies that per-pupil property wealth increased as per-pupil 
funding increased. 
The elasticity was calculated by regressing per-pupil Students FIRST 
funding on per-pupil property wealth and multiplying the regression coefficient 
by the ratio of average per-pupil property wealth to average per-pupil funding 
using the following formula (Odden & Picus, 2008): 
! = ! !!"!!  
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where 
e is the elasticity 
b is the regression coefficient !!" is the mean per-pupil property wealth ! is the mean per-pupil Students FIRST funding broken down 
 accordingly: !BR is mean per-pupil Building Renewal funds disbursed !DC  is mean per-pupil Deficiencies Correction funds disbursed !NSF is mean per-pupil New School Facilities funds disbursed !TSF is mean per-pupil Total Students FIRST funds disbursed 
I used the Odden and Picus (2008) standard of a correlation of less than 
0.5 with an elasticity of less than 0.1 to assess whether or not Students FIRST met 
the fiscal neutrality standard. If the correlation coefficient and elasticity did not 
meet these standards (i.e., are greater than 0.5 and 0.1, respectively), this would 
suggest that Students FIRST funding and property wealth were linked, the 
magnitude of that link was strong, and the system of facilities financing was not 
fiscally neutral. A correlation between funding and property wealth of less than 
0.5 and the elasticity less than 0.1 would suggest that Students FIRST funding 
was fiscally neutral. 
However, it is also possible that the elasticity standard set by Odden and 
Picus (2008) may be too stringent of a standard, particularly if assessing facilities 
funding. My findings, alongside the findings in the Kentucky study, suggest that 
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the traditional measures for fiscal neutrality should not be used to assess the 
equity of a facilities funding scheme. I also analyzed the eleven-year average of 
Total Students FIRST funding distributed to the sample school districts which 
helped to confirm that the current standard used to assess fiscal neutrality may not 
be appropriate to assess facilities funding. I discuss this further in Chapter Four 
and its implications in Chapter Five. 
An initial review of the descriptive statistics suggested that it was 
important to conduct a longitudinal study because Students FIRST funding levels 
and property wealth varied considerably, both by category and over time, between 
1999 and 2009. If I were to have only focused on one year, or a few selected 
years, my analyses of Students FIRST legislation may not have fully explained if 
a general and uniform capital funding scheme was created and sustained over 
time. My predictions were as follows. 
Total Students First Funds 
I predicted that total Students FIRST funds were distributed in a manner 
that was more fiscally neutral than Building Renewal and New School Facilities. 
As I discuss in the chapter that follows, this was not necessarily the case. 
However, I also predicted that the total funding was not consistently fiscally 
neutral throughout the eleven-year period of my study due to: a) the inconsistency 
of total funding distributed; b) the wide variation in total funding across districts 
between 2000 and 2009 because of a consistently large amount of funds 
distributed under the New School Facilities program; and c) Students FIRST 
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funding in all categories was distributed without the use of an equalization 
formula.15 Some of the findings I report in the next chapter were consistent with 
these predictions. 
Building Renewal 
Building Renewal evolved into an application based program in the latter 
years of Students FIRST, where only certain school districts received funds and 
others did not. Therefore, I expected that this program might not be consistently 
fiscally neutral. I thought it likely that Building Renewal was fiscally neutral 
between 1999 and 2007 but became less fiscally neutral after 2007 when the state 
reduced funding and required that districts apply for Building Renewal grants. 
The results did not support this prediction. 
Deficiencies Correction 
At the outset of my study, it seemed likely that funds from Deficiencies 
Correction were distributed in a fiscally neutral manner throughout the eleven-
year period of my study because they were be distributed to low property wealth 
districts that had the greatest facility needs prior to the Roosevelt (1994) decision. 
After 2004, when this program was renamed the Emergency Deficiencies 
program, funds continued to be available to school districts who were unable to 
raise enough capital funds locally to meet the facility standards set by the SFB. 
This suggested that funds from this program would be largely distributed to low 
                                                
15 As previously stated, Coons, et al. (Minorini & Sugarman, 1999) argued that a state’s 
finance system could be fiscally neutral through the use of a state aid formula that made every 
district equally wealthy. 
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property wealth districts and in a manner that was fiscally neutral. This was true 
in some, but not in all, of the years of my study. 
New School Facilities 
Of the three Student FIRST programs, I expected that the New School 
Facilities program to be the least fiscally neutral throughout the eleven-year 
period of my study. In this case, my prediction was correct. This program 
distributed funds to school districts that were growing and to school districts in 
need of additional space. An initial review of the SAV data from my sample 
indicated that districts that were growing tended to be property rich and districts 
that were classified as large and very large by the Arizona Auditor General. 
However, I also expected that after 2004, when facilities were brought up to 
standard, the New School Facilities funds went to districts with high property 
wealth. Because the Kentucky study conducted by Glenn, et al. (2009) suggested 
that districts with high property wealth tended to be large or very large, I 
presupposed the same would be true in Arizona. In other words, if Arizona 
followed the same pattern there would be a relationship between the total amount 
of Students FIRST funding districts received and the size of a school district for 
part of the eleven-year period of my study. This would indicate that Arizona’s 
capital funding scheme was not general and uniform due to the New School 
Facilities program. Thus, I analyzed the relationship between funding and the 
property wealth and the ADM of school districts.  When examining if the size of a 
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school district was associated with Students FIRST funding, I found no such 
association with the exception of 2007. 
Analysis by Size of School Districts 
As previously discussed, the variation in ADM between districts was 
large. I conducted a multiple regression analysis to assess if an additional 
variable, school district size, might explain some of the variation in the 
distribution of Total Students FIRST funds. As a first step, I examined the 
regression coefficients that I calculated as part of my fiscal neutrality analysis to 
determine if there were specific years and funding categories that warranted 
further analysis. Based on these findings, I analyzed two funding categories 
separately for one year, 2007: 1) Total Students FIRST funding; and 2) New 
School Facilities. I examined the relationship between each of the two funding 
categories, property wealth and district size. 
I used the following multiple regression equation: ! = !"!" + !!!"# + ! 
where 
Y is Students FIRST funding broken down accordingly: 
YTSF is per-pupil Total Students FIRST funds disbursed 
YNSF is per-pupil New School Facilities funds disbursed 
XPW is per-pupil property wealth, the first independent variable  
XADM is the size of the school district, the second independent variable 
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b is the regression weight for that particular variable 
a is the intercept 
Analysis of Eleven Year Average 
In a final analysis, I used the techniques described above to assess the 
fiscal neutrality of an eleven-year average of Students FIRST funding. This 
analysis served two purposes.  The funding districts received under the program 
was uneven from year to year so averaging the annual support accounted for this 
variation and also provided a summary measure of how each district fared under 
Students FIRST. 
Summary of Chapter 3 
In this chapter I described the statistical analyses I conducted to: a) 
examine Students FIRST between 1999 and 2009, measuring for fiscal neutrality, 
and b) determine if there was an association between school district size and total 
Students FIRST funding. In addition to property wealth and ADM, the variables 
of interest were funding per district received each year between 1999 and 2009 
from the Building Renewal, Deficiencies Correction, New School Facilities 
programs, and from the total Students FIRST funding of all three programs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
This chapter presents my findings on the relationship between Students 
FIRST funding and: 1) property wealth; and 2) school district size. Overall, my 
findings reveal that Students FIRST was not consistently fiscally neutral between 
1999 and 2009. However, I discovered that the standard set by Odden and Picus 
(2008) when measuring for fiscal neutrality may be too stringent of a standard to 
accurately assess if Students FIRST created a general and uniform capital finance 
scheme. My findings also reveal that for all but one year, the size and property 
wealth of school districts were not significant predictors of Students FIRST 
funding. Property wealth was weakly correlated with the eleven-year average of 
Students FIRST funding. 
Fiscal Neutrality Findings 
As previously stated, to assess for fiscal neutrality, I applied two common 
measures: 1) the correlation coefficient, to determine the correlation between per-
pupil Students FIRST funding and per-pupil property wealth; and 2) the elasticity, 
to measure the rate at which Students FIRST funding increased as property wealth 
increased. A correlation coefficient with a value of zero indicated there was no 
linear relationship between funding and property wealth. 
To better explain my fiscal neutrality findings, I begin by presenting the 
results for total Students FIRST then present the findings for each of the three 
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Students FIRST programs individually. Table 3 provides the summary fiscal 
neutrality statistics for Total Students FIRST funding. 
Total Students FIRST Funding 
Table 3 
Fiscal Neutrality Statistics, Total Students First Funding 
Year Correlation Coefficient Elasticity 
1999 0.05 0.02 
2000 0.00 0.01 
2001 0.05 0.00 
2002 0.00 0.00 
2003 0.07 0.08 
2004 0.10 0.16 
2005 0.08 0.12 
2006 0.06 0.00 
2007 0.19* 0.46 
2008 0.10 0.44 
2009 0.02 0.00 
Standard <0.50 <0.10 
Correlation between the 
two measures 
0.84  
 
 
In all eleven years of my study, there was a positive correlation between 
property wealth and Students FIRST funding, which indicates that per-pupil 
property wealth increased as per-pupil funding increased. Likewise, for all eleven 
years of my study, the elasticity for Total Students FIRST funding was below 1.0 
(e between 0.00 and 0.46), which would suggest that the variables did not increase 
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at the same percentage rate. However, the correlations between the variables were 
weak or had no relationship (RXY between 0.00 and 0.19). With the exception of 
2007, none of the correlations were statistically significant. That having been said, 
Total Students FIRST funding met the Odden and Picus standard for fiscal 
neutrality for seven of the eleven years analyzed. In all four years that Total 
Students FIRST funding did not meet the Odden and Picus standard, it was 
because the elasticity was higher than .10; all of the correlations between property 
wealth and Total Students FIRST funding met the Odden and Picus standard. In 
the only year that the correlation between property wealth and Total Students 
FIRST funding was statistically significant, 2007 (RXY = 0.19, e = 0.46), we can 
conclude that Total Students FIRST funding was less fiscally neutral than in any 
of the other years analyzed. As the analysis below will highlight, this result is 
driven by New Schools Facilities funding. In the other three years, the elasticity 
findings do not reveal much. This could be because the two measures of fiscal 
neutrality are related. As a final check on the results, I correlated the two 
measures for each year to see how tightly they are aligned. The results of this 
correlation are provided at the bottom of the table. For Total Students FIRST 
funding, the correlation between the correlation coefficient and elasticity was 0.84 
(p < 0.01). 
Building Renewal 
Table 4 shows the summary fiscal neutrality statistics for the Building 
Renewal program.  
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Table 4 
Fiscal Neutrality Statistics, Building Renewal 
Year Correlation Coefficient Elasticity 
1999 0.10 0.03 
2000 0.11 0.04 
2001 0.15 0.00 
2002 0.16* 0.00 
2003 0.04 0.02 
2004 No Funds Distributed 
2005 0.01 0.01 
2006 -0.05 -0.05 
2007 -0.04 -0.04 
2008 -0.05 -0.05 
2009 0.17* 0.00 
Standard <0.50 <0.10 
Correlation between 
the two measures 
0.67  
 
 
Fiscal neutrality results for the Building Renewal program were mixed and 
were similar to the findings for Total Students FIRST funding. The correlations 
between property wealth and Building Renewal were between -.05 and .17. 
Applying the Odden and Picus elasticity standard of <.01, this program was 
fiscally neutral in all ten years. Likewise, in only two of the ten years I analyzed 
the correlations, although weak, were statistically significant (RXY = 0.16 in 2002 
and 0.17 in 2009). 
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In 2002 and 2009 the elasticity calculations suggest that these statistically 
significant correlations are not substantively meaningful; the elasticity was well 
under the Odden and Picus standard of 0.10 (e =0.00 in 2002 and in 2009) 
indicating that Building Renewal was fiscally neutral on this measure. The 
elasticity results for the other eight years reveal little. As with Total Students 
FIRST funding, the two measures of fiscal neutrality are strongly correlated. 
Deficiencies Correction 
Table 5 shows the summary fiscal neutrality statistics for the Deficiencies 
Correction program. 
As with the Building Renewal program, the fiscal neutrality analysis of the 
Deficiencies Correction program reveal very little. Property wealth and 
Deficiencies Correction funding were positively correlated between 2002 and 
2006 (RXY between 0.03 and 0.9) and again in 2009 (RXY = 0.05). While these 
correlations are weak, they are also counterintuitive to the extent that we might 
expect property poor districts to receive more funding in this category and these 
results suggest the opposite. Property wealth and Deficiencies Correction funding 
were negatively correlated between 1999 and 2001 (RXY between -0.02 and -0.06) 
and again in 2008 (RXY = -0.03) indicating that as property wealth decreased 
Deficiencies Correction funding increased in these three years. However, in all 
eleven years, the relationships between these variables were weak; they were not 
statistically significant. 
  
  61 
Table 5 
Fiscal Neutrality Statistics, Deficiencies Correction 
Year Correlation Coefficient Elasticity 
1999 -0.02 -0.03 
2000 -0.06 -0.06 
2001 -0.05 -0.04 
2002 0.03 0.00 
2003 0.09 0.16 
2004 0.07 0.09 
2005 0.03 0.00 
2006 0.07 0.25 
2007 0.00 -0.02 
2008 -0.03 -0.15 
2009 0.05 0.29 
Standard <0.50 <0.10 
Correlation between 
the two measures 
0.78  
 
 
Again, consistent with my previous findings, the elasticity was well under 
1.0 for all eleven years in the analysis (e between -0.15 and 0.29) indicating that 
property wealth and funding did not decrease or increase at the same percentage 
rate. Based on the Odden and Picus standard for fiscal neutrality, the Deficiencies 
Correction program was fiscally neutral in eight of the eleven years analyzed. 
While the elasticity statistic did not meet the Odden and Picus standard in 2003, 
2006, and 2009 as the elasticity was higher than .10, because the correlation 
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between property wealth and Deficiencies Correction funding is so low, the 
elasticity statistic provides little additional information. 
New School Facilities 
The fiscal neutrality results from the New School Facilities program are 
similar to the findings from the other two Students FIRST programs. The 
correlations were both positive and negative but also consistently weak, and were 
not statistically significant in ten of the eleven years of the analysis. The New 
School Facilities program was fiscally neutral in seven of the eleven years 
analyzed, with this program being less fiscally neutral in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 
2008 because the elasticity statistic was higher than the Odden and Picus standard 
for fiscal neutrality. In 2007, however, the correlation coefficient was statistically 
significant, the elasticity rose above the standard and, thus based on the Odden 
and Picus standard, this program was less fiscally neutral in this year compared to 
any of the other years analyzed. Comparing these findings with the findings for 
Total Students FIRST funding and the other funding categories indicates that this 
program was driving the results reported for Total Students FIRST funding results 
outlined above. Table 6 contains the results of the New School Facilities analysis. 
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Table 6 
Fiscal Neutrality Statistics, New School Facilities 
Year Correlation Coefficient Elasticity 
1999 -0.01 -0.03 
2000 0.00 0.00 
2001 0.03 0.00 
2002 -0.03 0.00 
2003 -0.03 -0.16 
2004 0.07 0.28 
2005 0.08 0.18 
2006 0.06 0.00 
2007 0.20* 0.58 
2008 0.10 0.49 
2009 0.01 0.00 
Standard <0.50 <0.10 
Correlation between 
the two measures 
0.91  
 
 
Summary of Findings for Fiscal Neutrality 
The fiscal neutrality analysis revealed that most of the correlations 
between Students FIRST funding and property wealth were weak or had no 
relationship in all the eleven years of my study and in all four categories that I 
investigated. The Odden and Picus standard was met in most of the years of my 
study suggesting that Students FIRST was for the most part fiscally neutral 
according to this standard. However, in the majority of the years and across all 
funding categories analyzed, there were only three years where the correlations 
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were statistically significant: a) in 2002 and 2009 in the Building Renewal 
program; and b) in 2007 in the Total Students FIRST funding category and in the 
New School Facilities program. 
The results also illustrate that the two measures of fiscal neutrality, the 
correlation coefficient between property wealth and funding, and the elasticity 
statistic are strongly related. Because the elasticity statistic indicates the 
percentage change in funding relative to property wealth, it is often used to 
calculate the dollar value of a one percent change in property values (Odden & 
Picus, 2008). The findings here suggest that the correlation coefficient should be 
the threshold test for fiscal neutrality. Once the correlation coefficient suggests 
that a funding scheme is not fiscally neutral, then the elasticity statistic helps us 
better understand, in real terms, what that means.  That having been said, as I 
discuss in more detail in the final chapter, these results, coupled with the findings 
of Glenn et al. (2009) also suggest that the conventional fiscal neutrality measures 
used for assessing operational funds may have limited utility for assessing the 
fiscal neutrality of capital financing schemes. 
Multiple Regression Findings 
I conducted multiple regression analyses to assess the relationship 
between property wealth and ADM which serves as an indicator of district size on 
Total Students FIRST funding and the New School Facilities program for 2007 
because that was the only year that: 1) the correlations were significant; and 2) the 
elasticity was above the Odden and Picus elasticity standard of 0.10. Although I 
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ran the regression and inspected the models for all eleven years of my study,16 I 
only report the 2007 findings in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Relationship Between Total Students First (TSF)/New School Facilities, and 
Property Wealth/ADM 
 2007 
Variables TSF NSF 
Constant .196 (.042)* .196 (.043)* 
PW 2.46 (.015)* 2.48 (.014)* 
ADM -0.30 (.766) -0.18 (.861) 
F Statistic (df) 3.23 (2) 3.22 (2) 
R2 0.04 0.04 
*p<.05 
 
Total Students FIRST 
When conducting multiple regression for 2007, the overall model 
significantly predicted Total Students FIRST funding (R2 = 0.04, F(2, 162) = 
3.23, p <.05). Property wealth was a significant predictor of total funds: as 
property wealth increased, Total Students FIRST funding increased (t= 2.46; p = 
.015). However, ADM was not a significant predictor of Total Students FIRST 
funding (t =  -0.30; p = .77). 
 
                                                
16 Complete multiple regression statistics can be found in Appendix D. 
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New School Facilities 
The results for the New School Facilities program mirror that of Total 
Students FIRST funding. The overall model was statistically significantly 
although the R2 was low (R2 = 0.04, F(2, 162) = 3.22, p <.05). As property wealth 
increased, New School Facilities funding increased (t= 2.48; p = .014). However, 
ADM was not a significant predictor of funding for the New School Facilities 
program (t =  -0.18; p = .86). Adding district size then, did not change the results 
of the initial analysis. 
Assessing the Fiscal Neutrality of the Eleven Year Average 
Because the funds district received via Students FIRST varied widely 
across districts and also year to year, as a final step, I averaged the per-pupil total 
Students FIRST funding category and the per-pupil property wealth for all eleven 
years of my study and conducted the fiscal neutrality analysis described above for 
this eleven-year average. I then identified the districts that were below and above 
the means in terms of: a) per-pupil property wealth; and b) per-pupil Total 
Students FIRST funding. The eleven-year average allows me to more effectively 
assess the cumulative impact of the program, as well as better understand how 
individual districts fared under the program overall.   Appendix E lists the eleven-
year, per-pupil average of total Students FIRST funding and property wealth for 
my sample. 
Table 8 provides the Means and Standard Deviation of the eleven-year 
averages of property wealth and Total Students FIRST funding for the full 
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sample. As a point of comparison, the last three columns provide these figures for 
the three school districts that were the original plaintiffs in the in the Roosevelt 
(1994) lawsuit. 
 
Table 8 
Per-pupil Average of Plaintiff School Districts in Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994)* 
11-Year Avg 
11-Year Average Full 
Sample Mean (S.D.) Roosevelt Superior Isaac 
TSF Funding $989 ($1,500) $210 $668 $336 
PW $118,831 ($166,570) $52,307 $28,220 $24,805 
*Although San Carlos Unified was the fourth original plaintiff district, it was not 
included in my sample because it was a High Impact Aid district. 
 
 
When taking the eleven-year average of my sample, the variation in per-
pupil Total Students FIRST funding and per-pupil property wealth across the 
districts was large. Understandably, these statistics are similar to the descriptive 
statistics that I reported in the previous chapter when I examined the Students 
FIRST funding categories and property wealth by individual years. All three of 
the plaintiff school districts were well below the sample means for both Total 
Students FIRST funding and per-pupil property wealth. This suggests that these 
three property poor districts received fewer Students FIRST funds when 
compared to the majority of the public school districts in my sample. 
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Table 9 
Relationship Between the Eleven-year Per-pupil Average of Total Students FIRST 
Funding and Property Wealth 
  TSF 
PW Pearson Correlation .22 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .005** 
 Elasticity .24 
 N 165 
**p<.01 
 
 
Table 9 summarizes my correlation and elasticity statistics. The 
correlation between the eleven-year average of Total Students FIRST funding and 
property wealth was statistically significant. Although there was a weak 
correlation between these two variables, this correlation was stronger than most of 
the individual years and funding categories that I previously analyzed. In addition, 
the elasticity was higher than the Odden and Picus standard suggesting that 
Students FIRST was moving away from fiscal neutrality. My findings here 
suggest that property rich districts may have benefited to a greater extent from 
this type of funding scheme than districts with less property wealth. In the final 
chapter I discuss this finding further as I present the implications of my study. 
  
  69 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994) 
required Arizona to address inequities in public school facilities. I sought to 
analyze Arizona’s Students Fair and Immediate Resources for Students Today, 
the legislative remedy to the Roosevelt (1994) decision. Specifically, I 
investigated if Students FIRST created a general and uniform capital funding 
scheme between 1999 and 2009. Recall from the literature review that few 
empirical studies have evaluated the remedies of capital finance litigation and the 
equity of school facilities funding (Glenn, et al., 2009). My dissertation is 
significant as it is the first empirical study of Students FIRST and contributes to 
the growing body of research that assesses court-ordered legislative remedies 
related to capital finance reform. 
I replicated an equity measurement model, used in Glenn, et al.’s (2009) 
Kentucky study, to assess the fiscal neutrality of Arizona’s current public schools 
capital finance scheme. Like Glenn at all’s study of Kentucky’s capital finance 
scheme, my findings using traditional measures of fiscal neutrality did not reveal 
much, particularly in the analyses of individual years. Taken together, the two 
studies suggest that the techniques developed to assess the equity of operations 
funding may not sufficiently assess the fiscal neutrality of Students FIRST and 
other similar capital finance reforms. Bear in mind that the standard used by 
Glenn, et al. (2009), that I also adopted here, was developed to analyze the 
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distribution of operating expenses and not to analyze the distribution of capital 
funds. Thus, my study cannot appropriately suggest whether or not Students 
FIRST is general and uniform without conducting additional tests using another 
relevant measure more tightly aligned with facilities financing. 
However, the findings I report here can be used as a springboard for 
further research since my findings suggest inequities do exist. Generally speaking, 
property wealth was not a significant predictor of the facilities funding provided 
under Students FIRST except for a few years and across select programs. Yet, 
when property wealth was a significant predictor in certain categories and in three 
of the eleven years of my study, the school districts that resided in areas of 
increasing property wealth also experienced an increase in Students FIRST 
funding. This suggests that Students FIRST may not be a general and uniform 
funding scheme.  Coupled with my findings from Chapter Four, a final analysis 
aimed at elucidating the results of the fiscal neutrality analysis of the eleven-year 
average highlights how this could be cause for concern and suggests the need for 
additional research. 
When I correlated the eleven-year average of the per-pupil total Students 
FIRST funding distributed to districts and the eleven-year average of per-pupil 
property wealth, my findings implied that property rich school districts may have 
benefited most from Students FIRST. The following table summarizes these 
findings. 
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Table 10 shows that of the 5 school districts whose average property 
wealth were far above the mean,17 3 were also above the mean eleven-year 
average of per-pupil Total Students FIRST funding. Only 23 of the 113 school 
districts that were below the mean eleven-year average in property wealth 
received Total Students FIRST funding that was above the mean. 
 
 
Table 10 
Eleven Year Average of Per-pupil PW and TSF Funding 
   Number by Category 
Above the Mean 
Funding 
Mean PW, 11-year 
Average (M = $118,831) 
Number 
of 
Districts 
Number of Districts 
Above Mean TSF 
Funding (M = $989) 
DC 
Program 
NSF 
Program 
Below the Mean 
($1,802 - $110,529) 113 23 5 18 
Above the Mean 
($119,922 - $376,913) 47 17 9 8 
Far Above the Mean 
($628,700 - $1,625,434) 5 3 1 2 
TOTAL 165 43 15 28 
  
                                                
17 There was a wide gap between one school district that was above the mean and had an 
average per-pupil property wealth of $376,913 and the next district above the mean with a per-
pupil property wealth of $628,700. Because of this gap, I categorized districts with an average 
property wealth above $600,000 as Far Above the Mean. 
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The last two columns of Table 10 show the two categories of Students 
FIRST programs which caused each district’s Total Students FIRST funding to be 
above the mean: a) Deficiencies Corrections; and b) New School Facilities. These 
results were not driven by Building Renewal, the program designed to maintain 
minimum facility standards, as no district was above the mean as a result of 
funding from Building Renewal. 
Although my yearly analysis Students FIRST funding revealed that ADM 
was never a significant predictor of funding in any of the Students FIRST 
categories studied, when I compared districts by the eleven-year average, I found 
that the majority of school districts that were above the eleven-year mean of Total 
Students FIRST funding received funds intended for new facilities.  In other 
words, these results were driven by the New School Facilities program. Recall 
from Chapter One that the number of students served by a district and the square 
footage are part of the calculations to determine the funding allocation for this 
program; expanding existing facilities to meet the Building Adequacy Guidelines, 
and building additional facilities due to an increase in ADM, will increase the 
overall square footage in a school district. Thus, an additional variable that was 
not included in my analyses, or in Glenn et al.’s (2009) analyses, might be more 
appropriate for analyzing the outcomes of the Students FIRST funding scheme: 
square footage.  
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Table 11 
Median, Range, and Percentile Ranking - Eleven-year Average 
N 165 
Per-pupil PW 
Median $63,256 
Range $1,802 -
$1,623,632 
Percentile 
Ranking 
PW 
Per-pupil TSF 
Funding 
Median $572 
Range $60- 
$13,860 
Percentile 
Ranking 
TSF Funding 
Plaintiff Districts     
Roosevelt  $52,307 35.2 $210 17.0 
Superior $28,220 12.7 $668 55.8 
Isaac $24,805 10.3 $336 33.9 
Bottom Five Districts PW     
Indian Oasis $1,802 0.6 $711 58.8 
Gadsden $10,843 1.2 $786 62.4 
Naco $12,175 1.8 $809 64.2 
Somerton $15,175 2.4 $320 29.7 
Pima $16,695 3.0 $500 46.7 
Top Five Districts PW     
Riverside $628,700 97.6 $1,632 84.8 
Arlington $642,355 98.2 $1,738 86.7 
Cochise $663,631 98.8 $824 64.8 
Continental $753,973 99.4 $203 14.5 
Saddle Mt. $1,625,434 100 $2,863 93.9 
Bottom Five Districts 
TSF Funding  
   
Kyrene $108,137 66.7 $60 0.6 
Osborn $150,526 78.2 $80 1.2 
Madison $209,743 87.3 $82 1.8 
Catelina Foothills $101,310 63.0 $90 2.4 
Fountain Hills $172,807 83.0 $90 3.0 
Top Five Districts 
TSF Funding  
   
Yarnell $215,522 88.5 $5,094 97.6 
Young $234,949 91.5 $5,217 98.2 
JO Combs $44,771 27.9 $6,268 98.8 
Pategonia Union $368,357 96.4 $7,798 99.4 
Red Rock $343,096 95.8 $13,919 100 
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Finally, Table 11 summarizes the median and range of my sample and the 
distribution of school districts18 in five different categories: 1) plaintiff school 
districts; 2) school districts that were in the bottom-half of the property wealth 
distribution; 3) school districts that were in the top-half of the property wealth 
distribution; 4) school districts that were in the bottom-half of the total funding 
distribution; and 5) school districts that were in the top-half of the total funding 
distribution. I discuss each of these categories in turn below. 
Plaintiff Districts 
The Superior and Isaac School Districts were below the twentieth 
percentile of the per-pupil property wealth distribution and Roosevelt was below 
the fortieth percentile.  Yet none of the three rose above the sixtieth percentile in 
the average Total Students FIRST funding distribution. This suggests that the 
plaintiff school districts in the Roosevelt (1994) case did not receive substantial 
funding from Students FIRST between 1999 and 2009. 
Bottom and Top School Districts According to Per-pupil Property Wealth 
Of the five school districts that had the lowest average of property wealth, 
none rose above the seventieth percentile in the average per-pupil Total Students 
FIRST funding distribution. And of the top five property rich school districts, 
three were above the eightieth percentile in the per-pupil Students FIRST funding 
distribution. Here again, it appears that property rich school districts received a 
generous portion of the funding distributed under Students FIRST. 
                                                
18 Appendix E lists the distribution of my sample according to the eleven-year average of 
per-pupil property wealth and per-pupil Total Students FIRST funding. 
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Bottom and Top School Districts According to Per-pupil Total Students 
FIRST Funding 
What may be the strongest argument that property rich school districts 
benefited most from the Students FIRST legislation were the percentile results of 
three school districts that were above the ninetieth percentile of the per-pupil 
funding distribution. Red Rock, Pategonia Union, and Young were all school 
districts that were also above the ninetieth percentile of the average per-pupil 
property wealth distribution. 
The results here illustrate well what the correlation shown in Table 9 
means in real terms. Taken as a whole, the results above suggest that quite a few, 
but not all property wealthy districts received substantial funding under Students 
FIRST, whereas many, but not all property poor districts did not. 
Implications 
So what are the implications of my study? Overall, my findings imply that 
this is just the first step in gaining a deeper understanding of Students FIRST. For 
Arizona policymakers the results documented here suggest that Students FIRST 
may not have created a general and uniform capital funding scheme. Further 
research is needed in order to understand the implications of distributing Students 
FIRST funds without an equalization formula.  For Arizona school districts, my 
study should not be taken as an indication that Arizona’s system is completely 
flawed. Rather, my findings imply that additional analyses are needed in order to 
better understand whether or not Students FIRST is general and uniform. 
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Table 12 
Summary of Students FIRST Funding Distribution, 1999-2009 
 Building 
Renewal 
Deficiencies 
Correction 
New School 
Facilities Total Funding 
Total 
Amount 
N 165 
$599,059,738 $992,482,502 $2,487,956,898 $4,079,499,138 
 
 
Consider the information summarized in Table 12: 1) Between 1999 and 
2009, the State of Arizona distributed just over $4 billion dollars in Students 
FIRST funds to the 165 public school districts in my sample; 2) The program that 
was allocated the least amount of funds was the program intended to ensure 
school districts maintained minimal standards.  In total, only $600,000 was 
distributed under the Building Renewal program. In contrast, the largest portion 
of the total funding, approximately $2.5 billion, was distributed via the New 
School Facilities program; and 3) just under $1 billion was distributed for 
Deficiencies Correction. This, coupled with my findings that indicated that the 
New School Facilities program drove much of my results, implies that the school 
districts that were growing and/or in need of additional facility space benefited 
most from Students FIRST in the eleven years of my study; it also implies that 
these districts were not always the most disadvantaged in terms of their ability to 
raise funds to address facility needs. Thus, there are a number of policy 
implications that can be drawn from these findings.  
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In Chapter One, I noted the following: 1) the state legislature decided to 
fully fund Students FIRST without an equalization formula; and 2) all of the 
funds from Students FIRST were distributed without any consideration of the 
property wealth of each school district. These two points along with the findings 
presented above and the results presented in Chapter Four, suggest that while 
Students FIRST did not create egregious inequalities in funding, it may not be 
fully equitable and may have cost Arizona taxpayers millions of dollars.  
Arguably, the state legislature could have required the funds to be distributed 
more equitably using an equalization formula. It is likely that the state would have 
spent far less money if it had targeted the funds to the districts most in need rather 
than making them available to all districts regardless of need.  Any cost savings 
that resulted from using an equalization formula could have been used to 
supplement the funds provided to school districts that were not able to raise 
sufficient funds to meet and maintain minimal facility standards as opposed to 
building new facilities in high property wealth districts. Moving forward, as fiscal 
demands continue to challenge the state, policymakers may wish to explore the 
option of establishing an equalization formula to distribute Students FIRST funds. 
Yet further research is needed, using an improved equity model specifically 
designed to assess facilities funding, in order to confirm that: 1) Students FIRST 
may not be fully equitable; and 2) that Arizona could have approached funding 
Students FIRST in a manner that was more cost effective and possibly more 
equitable than the current funding scheme. 
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Conclusion 
When evaluating the remedies of capital finance litigation and analyzing 
the equity in public school facilities, researchers might consider approaching their 
studies differently than the methods that are presently used. Recall from Chapter 
1, when measuring for fiscal neutrality, finance experts have traditionally assessed 
the relationship between two variables: 1) current operating expenditures per-
pupil and 2) property wealth per-pupil (Odden & Picus, 2008). My findings 
suggest that, when assessing the equity of a capital funding scheme, square 
footage may be a more appropriate variable to use in tests of fiscal neutrality than 
property wealth alone. 
Although it is tempting to conclude that there are clear winners and losers 
as a result of the Students FIRST legislation, my findings merely point to some 
evidence of inequality that is not definitive. The results of my study revealed gaps 
in the ability of school finance experts to effectively assess inequity in the funding 
of public school facilities. Simply stated, the conventional measures I used to 
assess the fiscal neutrality of Students FIRST did not appropriately assess if 
Students FIRST created a general and uniform capital finance scheme between 
1999 and 2009.  I suggest that school finance researchers need to look further and 
develop measures to better assess the equity of capital funding. 
Fifteen years after the Roosevelt (1994) decision, Arizona continued to 
have some public school districts that were property poor and some that were 
property rich. The range in property wealth across districts can create disparities 
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on many different levels. I am concerned about the recent cuts in Students FIRST 
funding. Rather than seeking alternative revenues to support public school 
facilities, the Arizona Legislature has chosen to make deep cuts to capital funding, 
especially in the Building Renewal program. School districts are presently finding 
it challenging to raise enough revenue to meet facility standards. As suggested in 
a recent newspaper article, (Ortega, 2011) Arizona may be reversing any gains 
that it may have made as a result of the Students FIRST legislation. As was the 
case before the Roosevelt (1994) decision, schools residing in property rich 
districts may be forced to raise additional funds for the upkeep of their facilities 
via bonds and capital overrides. However, with declining property values, even 
property rich school districts may find it challenging to raise enough revenues to 
meet minimum facility standards (Hansen, 2011). And what about the property 
poor districts that relied on Students FIRST funding to meet their facilities needs? 
These districts may have no choice but to wait for a new legal challenge that will 
allow the Arizona Supreme Court to assess whether or not inequities continue 
today. 
I close my dissertation with many more questions than when I started my 
study. If Students FIRST does not fully address inequities in school facilities 
funding and possibly reinforces existing inequalities, who might be the victims? 
The children that attend Arizona public schools in some districts are now faced 
with the possibility of deteriorating classrooms and unsafe conditions. What does 
this say about our priorities when Students First funding has been slashed, and for 
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many school districts, eliminated? Students in property poor districts may have 
very different learning environments from those in more affluent areas and with 
better facilities. How will we be judged when future generations reflect on how 
we cared for our young, for those most vulnerable, and for the marginalized? 
I began my dissertation with a discussion of the court case that was central 
to my study, Roosevelt v. Bishop (1994). And so, I conclude my dissertation with 
an excerpt from the Roosevelt opinion written by Justice Fredrick J. Martone to 
remind those who have an interest in Students FIRST of the responsibility that the 
Arizona Legislature has to fund its public school system in an equitable manner 
so that everyone wins, and no one loses: 
As the conventioneers who drafted Arizona’s constitution foresaw, public 
education has been a key to America’s success. The education provisions 
of the constitution acknowledge that an enlightened citizenry is critical to 
the existence of free institutions, limited government, economic and 
personal liberty, and individual responsibility. Financing a general and 
uniform public school system is in our collective self-interest. (Roosevelt 
v. Bishop, 1994, p.23) 
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Ash Fork   X  X    
Alpine Elementary        X 
Apache Elementary        X 
Ash Creek Elementary        X 
Benson Elementary   X X  X   
Benson Union   X X  X   
Benson Unified   X X  X   
Bicentennial Union   X      
Blue Elementary        X 
Bouse Elementary        X 
Buena X   X     
Buena Elementary X   X     
Buena Union X   X     
Cedar Unified       X  
Champie Elementary X        
Chevelon Butte X        
Chinile Unified       X  
Chloride Elementary   X   X   
Clark County X X       
Coconino County  X X      
Congress Elementary   X      
Crown King Elementary        X 
Eagle Elementary X        
Empire Elementary X        
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Esperanza Accommodation  X X      
Forrest Elementary X        
Fort Huachuca Accommodation  X X      
Fort Thomas Unified       X  
Fredonia-Moccasin   X X  X   
Ganado Unified       X  
Gila Bend Unified       X  
Gila County  X X      
Greenlee Alternative  X X      
Greenlee County  X X      
Graham County  X X      
Hackberry Elementary        X 
Hillside Elementary        X 
Kayenta Unified       X  
Kingman Elementary   X X  X   
Kingman Unified   X X  X   
Klondyke Elementary X        
Littlefield Elementary   X X  X   
Littlefield Unified   X X  X   
Maricopa County  X X      
Mary C O’Brien Accommodation  X X      
Mcnary Elementary       X  
McNeal Elementary        X 
Mohave County X X       
Mohave Union   X X  X   
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Mobile Elementary        X 
Navajo County X X       
Owens-Whitney Elementary        X 
Parker Unified       X  
Peach Springs Unified       X  
Pima Accommodation  X X      
Pinal County  X X      
Pinon Unified       X  
Rainbow Accommodation  X X      
Reddington Elementary X        
Red Mesa Unified       X  
Rucker Elementary X        
San Carlos Unified       X  
Sanders Unified       X  
San Fernando Elementary        X 
Santa Cruz County  X X      
Sacaton Elementary       X  
Sedona-Oak Creek     X    
Sentinel Elementary        X 
Sierra Vista Unified  X       
Skull Valley Elementary        X 
Tuba City Unified       X  
Walnut Grove Elementary X        
Wickenberg Unified     X    
Williamson Valley X        
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Valentine Elementary       X  
Whiterivier Unified       X  
Window Rock Unified       X  
Yavapai Accommodation  X X      
Yucca Elementary        X 
Yuma County  X X      
Total: 80 16 19 28 12 3 10 18 15 
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SIZE CATEGORIES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
  
  92 
 
Size 
Categories* 
ADM 
Very 
Small 
0 – 199 
Small 
200 – 
599 
Medium 
600 – 
1,999 
Medium-
Large 
2K–7,999 
Large 
8K–
19,999 
Very Large 
20K & 
Above 
1999 32 28 39 42 15 9 
2000 32 27 40 42 15 9 
2001     15 10 
2002     15 10 
2003     16 10 
2004     16 10 
2005     16 10 
2006     17 9 
2007     17 9 
2008     19 11 
2009     19 11 
*School districts from my sample are sorted according to the size categories used in the 2009 
Auditor General’s Dollars Spent in the Classroom and Prop 301 Report. Reports regarding 
classroom dollars were not required until 2000 and the reports did not categorize districts by size 
until 2001. The Very Small category was added in 2003 and the Medium-Large category was 
added in 2009. 
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Impact Aid Information for 2007, 2008, 2009 
LEA FIA AVG State Aid AVG % PAV Tax 
Dysart Unified District $66,760 $83,071,048 0.08% Yes 
Mesa Unified District $335,840 $272,099,780 0.12% Yes 
Vail Unified District $64,118 $33,446,722 0.19% Yes 
Litchfield Elementary District $75,458 $35,111,042 0.21% Yes 
Tucson Unified District $768,933 $213,074,229 0.36% Yes 
Palominas Elementary District $29,735 $7,604,360 0.39% Yes 
Yuma Elementary District $172,531 $39,581,405 0.44% Yes 
Somerton Elementary District $56,520 $11,553,953 0.49% Yes 
Flagstaff Unified District $435,949 $29,560,730 1% Yes 
Laveen Elementary District $165,472 $16,284,212 1% Yes 
Maricopa Unified District $207,792 $22,425,839 1% Yes 
Miami Unified District $40,780 $4,662,190 1% Yes 
Tombstone Unified District $20,384 $3,263,242 1% Yes 
Mohave Valley Elementary District $74,297 $5,810,936 1% Yes 
Camp Verde Unified District $92,840 $5,257,898 2% Yes 
Coolidge Unified District $396,912 $18,436,260 2% Yes 
Fountain Hills Unified District $60,899 $2,575,089 2% Yes 
Casa Grande Union High District $307,703 $11,855,496 3% Yes 
Sierra Vista Unified District $663,305 $22,236,615 3% Yes 
Joseph City Unified District $16,529 $452,530 4% Yes 
Stanfield Elementary District $105,402 $2,970,301 4% Yes 
Clarksdale-Jerome Elementary District $64,762 $1,341,017 5% Yes 
Seligman Unified District* $18,132 $318,238 6% Yes 
Fredonia-Moccasin Unified District $134,003 $1,537,333 9% Yes 
St. Johns Unified District $208,596 $2,152,431 10% Yes 
Globe Unified District $849,962 $7,962,027 11% Yes 
Winslow Unified District $1,637,961 $9,234,264 18% Yes 
Holbrook Unified District $3,493,641 $9,326,532 37% Yes 
Page Unified District $4,249,683 $9,787,469 43% Yes 
Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified $2,398,326 $5,277,388 45% Yes 
Grand Canyon Unified District $691,405 $1,354,068 51% Yes 
Sanders Unified District $3,094,642 $5,378,102 58% No 
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LEA FIA AVG State Aid AVG % PAV Tax 
Ganado Unified School District $5,531,625 $9,401,059 59% No 
Valentine Elementary District $240,776 $335,395 72% Yes 
Tuba City Unified District $7,844,169 $10,641,696 74% No 
Cedar Unified District $2,351,267 $3,052,550 77% No 
Parker Unified School District $5,622,376 $6,750,293 83% No 
Mcnary Elementary District $1,117,979 $1,147,294 97% No 
Pinon Unified District $7,059,319 $6,977,911 101% No 
Ft Thomas Unified District $2,600,763 $2,565,566 101% No 
Sacaton Elementary District $2,499,612 $2,439,278 102% No 
Gila Bend Unified District $173,210 $167,461 103% Yes 
Red Mesa Unified District $5,452,052 $5,218,204 104% No 
Chinle Unified District $20,890,362 $19,844,935 105% No 
Window Rock Unified District $13,573,732 $12,594,967 108% No 
Kayenta Unified District $12,135,485 $10,988,338 110% No 
San Carlos Unified District $6,875,444 $6,218,581 111% No 
Whiteriver Unified District $12,181,332 $10,394,340 117% No 
Peach Springs Unified District $1,148,376 $857,626 134% Yes 
Ft. Hachua Accommodation District**  $7,264,016 $0 - No 
Gila County Regional Special 
District** $13,315 $0 - No 
Rainbow Accommodation District** $12,112 $0 - No 
*Only 2009 FIA dollars for Seligman Unified District reported 
**Accommodation and Special Districts Do Not Receive State Aid 
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Relationship Between Total Students First Funding, Property Wealth, and ADM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Constant 
(Sig.) 
.131 
(.244) 
.044 
(.853) 
.102 
(.430) 
.158 
(.130) 
.179 
(.071) 
.151 
(.155) 
.121 
(.304) 
.065 
(.708) 
.196 
(.042)* 
 .101 
(.435) 
.045 
(.848) 
PW .472 
(.637) 
-.008 
(.994) 
.462 
(.644) 
-.239 
(.811) 
.607 
(.545) 
1.07 
(.288) 
.928 
(.355) 
.738 
(.462) 
2.46 
(.015)* 
 1.15 
(.251) 
.160 
(.873) 
ADM -1.58 
(.116) 
-.563 
(.574) 
-1.17 
(.244) 
-2.03 
(.044)* 
-2.16 
(.032)* 
-1.49 
(.139) 
-1.11 
(.268) 
-.269 
(.788) 
-0.30 
(.766) 
-0.40 
(.693) 
-.515 
(.607) 
F Statistic 1.42 0.16 0.85 2.07 2.70 1.89 1.20 0.35 3.23 0.84 0.17 R! 0.02 0.002 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.004 0.04 0.01 0.002 
*p< .05 
 
 
Relationship Between New School Facilities Funds, Property Wealth, and ADM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 2006  2007 2008 2009 
Constant 
(Sig.) 
.032 
(.921) 
.037 
(.896) 
.065 
(.712) 
.094 
(.490) 
.067 
(.694) 
.084 
(.565) 
.094 
(.486) 
.060 
(.746) 
.196 
(.043)* 
 .101 
(.438) 
.039 
(.886) 
PW -.124 
(.902) 
-.028 
(.978) 
.337 
(.737) 
-.483 
(.630) 
-.521 
(.603) 
.812 
(.418) 
.901 
(.369) 
.765 
(.446) 
2.48 
(.014)* 
 1.17 
(.242) 
.065 
(.948) 
ADM -.396 
(.693) 
-.469 
(.640) 
-.719 
(.473) 
-1.14 
(.256) 
-.734 
(.464) 
-.597 
(.551) 
-.675 
(.501) 
.153 
(.879) 
-0.18 
(.861) 
-0.34 
(.737) 
-.469 
(.640) 
F Statistic 0.08 0.11 0.34 0.71 0.37 0.57 0.72 0.30 3.22 0.83 0.12 R! 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.04 0.01 0.001 
*p< .05 
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FUNDING AND PROPERTY WEALTH 
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Rank Order: Eleven-year Average Per-pupil Property Wealth 
LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified District $1,802 
Gadsden Elementary District $10,843 
Naco Elementary District $12,175 
Somerton Elementary District $15,175 
Pima Unified District $16,695 
Winslow Unified District $17,834 
Eloy Elementary District $19,363 
Mammoth-San Manuel Unified District $19,523 
Cartwright Elementary District $19,656 
Thatcher Unified District $20,039 
Nogales Unified District $20,849 
Globe Unified District $21,118 
Holbrook Unified District $21,742 
Sunnyside Unified District $22,436 
Safford Unified District $22,960 
Hayden-Winkelman Unified District $24,616 
Isaac Elementary District $24,805 
Colorado City Unified District $24,815 
Duncan Unified District $25,284 
Douglas Unified District $27,810 
Superior Unified School District $28,220 
Crane Elementary District $28,504 
St Johns Unified District $28,745 
Snowflake Unified District $29,339 
Glendale Elementary District $30,001 
Flowing Wells Unified District $30,246 
Pendergast Elementary District $30,785 
Alhambra Elementary District $31,018 
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LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Ajo Unified District $34,288 
Coolidge Unified District $34,783 
Willcox Unified District $36,575 
Santa Cruz Valley Unified District $38,952 
Peoria Unified School District $39,373 
Bisbee Unified District $39,857 
Maricopa Unified School District $40,409 
Elfrida Elementary District $41,035 
Miami Unified District $41,283 
Altar Valley Elementary District $42,370 
Marana Unified District $43,488 
Florence Unified School District $43,603 
Pomerene Elementary District $43,663 
Gilbert Unified District $43,876 
Mesa Unified District $43,900 
Double Adobe Elementary District $44,127 
Tombstone Unified District $44,153 
J O Combs Unified School District $44,771 
Page Unified District $45,603 
St David Unified District $45,837 
Tucson Unified District $47,393 
Camp Verde Unified District $47,964 
Murphy Elementary District $48,754 
Vail Unified District $49,353 
Palominas Elementary District $49,957 
Santa Cruz Elementary District $50,110 
Casa Grande Elementary District $50,897 
Laveen Elementary District $51,758 
Wellton Elementary District $51,858 
Roosevelt Elementary District $52,307 
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LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Avondale Elementary District $53,233 
Chino Valley Unified District $54,309 
Sahuarita Unified District $54,927 
Aguila Elementary District $55,239 
Buckeye Elementary District $55,600 
Yuma Elementary District $56,481 
Mayer Unified School District $56,655 
Humboldt Unified District $56,808 
Creighton Elementary District $57,361 
Hyder Elementary District $57,511 
Littleton Elementary District $57,964 
Queen Creek Unified District $58,625 
Grand Canyon Unified District $58,672 
Ray Unified District $59,014 
Tolleson Elementary District $59,109 
Fowler Elementary District $59,265 
Chandler Unified District $59,462 
Stanfield Elementary District $59,579 
Show Low Unified District $59,981 
Toltec Elementary District $60,454 
Solomon Elementary District $61,116 
Union Elementary District $61,255 
Liberty Elementary District $61,620 
Clifton Unified District $61,878 
Deer Valley Unified District $63,256 
Apache Junction Unified District $63,554 
Dysart Unified District $64,596 
Washington Elementary School District $64,886 
Higley Unified School District $65,655 
Amphitheater Unified District $71,669 
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LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Litchfield Elementary District $72,320 
Paloma School District $75,069 
Palo Verde Elementary District $81,421 
Blue Ridge Unified District $81,511 
Yuma Union High School District $83,731 
Paradise Valley Unified District $83,788 
Bullhead City School District $84,192 
Flagstaff Unified District $84,924 
Bowie Unified District $86,120 
Mohawk Valley Elementary District $86,141 
Payson Unified District $88,221 
Canon Elementary District $89,940 
Cottonwood-Oak Creek Elementary District $93,865 
Phoenix Elementary District $96,432 
Picacho Elementary District $98,064 
Catalina Foothills Unified District $101,310 
Mohave Valley Elementary District $102,528 
Lake Havasu Unified District $104,062 
San Simon Unified District $104,430 
Beaver Creek Elementary District $107,299 
Balsz Elementary District $108,057 
Kyrene Elementary District $108,137 
Wilson Elementary District $108,892 
Nadaburg Unified School District $109,223 
Tanque Verde Unified District $110,529 
Clarkdale-Jerome Elementary District $119,922 
Tolleson Union High School District $123,917 
Heber-Overgaard Unified District $123,930 
Williams Unified District $124,651 
Tempe Elementary School District $126,590 
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LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Antelope Union High School District $131,074 
Glendale Union High School District $131,193 
Kirkland Elementary District $132,802 
Prescott Unified District $133,859 
Pearce Elementary District $139,791 
Patagonia Elementary District $141,059 
Santa Cruz Valley Union High School Dist $145,118 
Casa Grande Union High School District $150,034 
Concho Elementary District $150,153 
Round Valley Unified District $150,175 
Osborn Elementary District $150,526 
Valley Union High School District $152,492 
Morristown Elementary District $159,222 
Quartzsite Elementary District $160,766 
Sonoita Elementary District $162,840 
Tonto Basin Elementary District $164,405 
Scottsdale Unified District $168,452 
Agua Fria Union High School District $172,697 
Fountain Hills Unified District $172,807 
Bonita Elementary District $176,374 
Salome Consolidated Elementary District $178,002 
Bagdad Unified District $181,030 
Wenden Elementary District $181,444 
Vernon Elementary District $187,915 
Topock Elementary District $198,105 
Madison Elementary District $209,743 
Seligman Unified District $211,158 
Yarnell Elementary District $215,522 
Buckeye Union High School District $219,606 
Mingus Union High School District $219,716 
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LEA Name 
PW 
Mean $188,831 
Median $63,256 
Colorado River Union High School District $229,002 
Phoenix Union High School District $232,269 
Young Elementary District $234,949 
Joseph City Unified District $266,178 
Tempe Union High School District $268,736 
Cave Creek Unified District $279,473 
Maine Consolidated School District $282,254 
Oracle Elementary District $315,361 
Morenci Unified District $330,692 
Red Rock Elementary District $343,096 
Patagonia Union High School District $368,357 
Pine Strawberry Elementary District $376,913 
Riverside Elementary District $628,700 
Arlington Elementary District $642,355 
Cochise Elementary District $663,631 
Continental Elementary District $753,973 
Saddle Mountain Unified School District (formerly 
Ruth Fisher) $1,625,434 
  
  105 
Rank Order: Eleven-year Average Per-pupil Total Students FIRST Funding 
LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Kyrene Elementary District $60 
Osborn Elementary District $80 
Madison Elementary District $82 
Catalina Foothills Unified District $90 
Fountain Hills Unified District $90 
Mohave Valley Elementary District $107 
Paradise Valley Unified District $110 
Tempe Union High School District $127 
Amphitheater Unified District $137 
Picacho Elementary District $137 
Lake Havasu Unified District $137 
Chino Valley Unified District $143 
Phoenix Elementary District $149 
Bullhead City School District $150 
Wilson Elementary District $158 
Beaver Creek Elementary District $165 
Tempe ElementarySchool District $168 
Flowing Wells Unified District $177 
Phoenix Union High School District $177 
Page Unified District $187 
Yuma Elementary District $190 
Scottsdale Unified District $198 
Washington Elementary School District $199 
Continental Elementary District $203 
Willcox Unified District $207 
Mesa Unified District $207 
Safford Unified District $209 
Roosevelt Elementary District $210 
  106 
LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Stanfield Elementary District $225 
Alhambra Elementary District $234 
Payson Unified District $240 
Marana Unified District $246 
Santa Cruz Valley High School District $250 
Thatcher Unified District $250 
Heber-Overgaard Unified District $254 
Sunnyside Unified District $255 
Mingus Union High School District $257 
Glendale Union High School District $258 
Prescott Unified District $260 
Blue Ridge Unified District $263 
Morenci Unified District $265 
Colorado River Union High School District $282 
Creighton Elementary District $283 
Show Low Unified District $293 
Glendale Elementary District $297 
Tucson Unified District $298 
Round Valley Unified District $302 
Cottonwood-Oak Creek Elementary District $319 
Somerton Elementary District $320 
Palominas Elementary District $325 
Pine Strawberry Elementary District $327 
Gilbert Unified District $331 
Nogales Unified District $331 
Peoria Unified School District $331 
Clarkdale-Jerome Elementary District $332 
Isaac Elementary District $336 
Murphy Elementary District $338 
Camp Verde Unified District $341 
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LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Eloy Elementary District $344 
Clifton Unified District $348 
Valley Union High School District $353 
Tanque Verde Unified District $356 
Grand Canyon Unified District $357 
Wellton Elementary District $368 
Flagstaff Unified District $373 
Concho Elementary District $379 
Topock Elementary District $416 
Pendergast Elementary District $431 
Mohawk Valley Elementary District $434 
Apache Junction Unified District $434 
Cartwright Elementary District $441 
Bisbee Unified District $472 
Balsz Elementary District $475 
Patagonia Elementary District $479 
Pomerene Elementary District $485 
Winslow Unified District $494 
Pima Unified District $500 
Deer Valley Unified District $507 
Humboldt Unified District $507 
Duncan Unified District $521 
Cave Creek Unified District $522 
Oracle Elementary District $533 
Mammoth-San Manuel Unified District $572 
Pearce Elementary District $575 
Quartzsite Elementary District $577 
Avondale Elementary District $580 
Snowflake Unified District $586 
Casa Grande Elementary District $592 
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LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Solomon Elementary District $605 
Crane Elementary District $638 
Douglas Unified District $646 
Superior Unified School District $668 
Joseph City Unified District $671 
Sahuarita Unified District $671 
Morristown Elementary District $673 
San Simon Unified District $689 
Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified District $711 
Chandler Unified District $725 
Toltec Elementary District $729 
St Johns Unified District $742 
Santa Cruz Valley Unified District $744 
St David Unified District $784 
Gadsden Elementary District $786 
Ajo Unified District $805 
Liberty Elementary District $808 
Naco Elementary District $809 
Cochise Elementary District $824 
Elfrida Elementary District $848 
Litchfield Elementary District $849 
Salome Consolidated Elementary District $855 
Yuma Union High School District $857 
Canon Elementary District $862 
Altar Valley Elementary District $883 
Holbrook Unified District $884 
Globe Unified District $885 
Hayden-Winkelman Unified District $891 
Williams Unified District $891 
Hyder Elementary District $907 
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LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Mayer Unified School District $942 
Miami Unified District $969 
Tombstone Unified District $973 
Bagdad Unified District $973 
Palo Verde Elementary District $1010 
Kirkland Elementary District $1012 
Casa Grande Union High School District $1029 
Tolleson Elementary District $1033 
Fowler Elementary District $1058 
Wenden Elementary District $1071 
Vail Unified District $1136 
Seligman Unified District $1208 
Tonto Basin Elementary District $1276 
Bonita Elementary District $1311 
Antelope Union High School District $1368 
Aguila Elementary District $1499 
Laveen Elementary District $1501 
Tolleson Union High School District $1508 
Agua Fria Union High School District $1569 
Littleton Elementary District $1592 
Colorado City Unified District $1630 
Riverside Elementary District $1632 
Paloma School District $1634 
Sonoita Elementary District $1711 
Arlington Elementary District $1738 
Queen Creek Unified District $1825 
Bowie Unified District $1838 
Santa Cruz Elementary District $1847 
Coolidge Unified District $1862 
Maine Consolidated School District $1972 
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LEA Name 
TSF Funding 
Mean $989 
Median $572 
Dysart Unified District $2001 
Ray Unified District $2100 
Buckeye Elementary District $2107 
Nadaburg Unified School District $2512 
Higley Unified School District $2642 
Buckeye Union High School District $2645 
Saddle Mountain Unified School District $2863 
Double Adobe Elementary District $2902 
Vernon Elementary District $2935 
Florence Unified School District $3129 
Union Elementary District $3260 
Maricopa Unified School District $3834 
Yarnell Elementary District $5094 
Young Elementary District $5217 
J O Combs Unified School District $6268 
Patagonia Union High School District $7798 
Red Rock Elementary District $13,919 
 
 
